Work
from 1973-2000 (fragments)
A-N Towards Art and Language as "in
the last analysis"[Writing] does not give rise to a hermeneutic
deciphering, to the decoding of a meaning or truth.
A
If
the a priori of this text is not (significantly or is) its subject , as of all
texts? and the problematics
relating to textuality, the nature of the text but
not the texts subject and the subject has a content that normalized grammars
will not see it, other than perhaps a set of statements which can appear
contradictory, it is both behind and before the writing and not here present in
whatever form we consider, is not here a consideration, here it is a mistake, one of many ,'these are never
articulated, in the subject, but if at all in the event, this event, which
follows the falsification of content and meaning.' Art - or anything other than
language, only if we consider that language stands outside its description, or otherwise we need to re cast the text
towards its subject at the expense of its guarantees given above, at the
expense of being what it has become. This subject itself being free of such
guarantees, or systems, or yet to establish any, its pre-established state is
not a consequence of its yet to be, or may be, or becoming, or eventuality, if
we consider consequences in a particular way, non historical associations for
instance. Lets try to be positive,
my difficulty of naming is that the
arrival of a name legitimates certain moves, rather perhaps there should be a
list of names, for no other reason other than a psychological economy, at this
instance, which is itself economic , movement, opening, longing, waiting, yet
to begin, even in phenomenology the
subjectivity of a certain presence which
appears before the presence, its
presence, preventing the beginning of phenomenology itself, until the activity
of phenomenology or anything else takes place and objectifies - or attempts to,
de subjectifies at least, fails to ground, yet provides
a ground. The subject is represented by
a state, a feeling which is a presence which was once established as some
movement towards an object, as here it is also. This writing in itself now
becomes a movement towards the subjective subject and not a description , or
critique, deconstruction etc of it. It then becomes of itself a subject which
destabilizes itself, and then moves before this, stepping outside of its own
constraints, if it could step, and here it attempts, falsely a signification.
B
Iconographical
metaphysics - here, is a picture of a desired impossibility, it is opaque, which in its desirability, unachangability is a metaphysical 'idea' or picture, the
desire, the lack in metaphysics of the cosmos, a lack for the impossible, the
incompleteness of that which cannot be complete, not of the created impossible
idea, but that being is disrupted not by itself, is itself disruption, desire
of desire in our terms, the aporia of language, a priori, the limit to being and
knowledge which is indefinable, that which
language attempts - is a non-existent ideality, which as the immediate presentation of the
present avoids the nihilism of the
eternal return of the same's non-teleological presence.
C
Reading
Nietzsche as a paradigm for reading art as language- or art as text -etc.
Reading
Nietzsche and relying on a reading, what reading is, in the sense of partial
reading or to ask the question how could it be a complete reading, and as to where the
contradiction is, where the error is, there, not if any at all, or in here, by
recourse to itself, not a recourse to Nietzsche’s, then one can ask, who or
what is one reading, and how, and why. How does one deal with such supposed
dual, or multiplicity of readings, and
potential readings. I'm not answering such a question, in any case a dealing
with... is, if not impossible certainly
unlikely, so we are left with
writing? Potentially difficult in its
sense of motivation regarding the empty tautological space - spaces? which are
provided. If as we say a contradiction occurs, which is wrong, we invoke a
reading of language which might well reduce to either tautologies or
contradictions, how then is our reading a reading of anything at all. So if we
want to read anything, read in a different way, to a fixing on some
contradiction whoever is writing or reading, but to engaging with them, which is very much
what I at least would wish to do, as for Nietzsche, the development of his
apparent contradictions, though I have tried to point to these, I would not
mind playing a further part in whatever activity might take place around them,
though this is perhaps a philosophical
task, or a task of literary criticism..
for myself however their role is essential in both destabilizing the
text, is part of a programme
of writing before the logical framework, which is perhaps philosophy, or the
end of art, the root of the idea. Around this disruption, which is yet to have
a static object to disrupt, this is a site which interests me. We arrive
disrupted, confused, yet these words - like all , work backwards from an idea
of objectivity- only in some senses-
which is an idea of language, and
logic. Which places us back with the unspeakable, empty, diseased view of
philosophy, metaphysics and questions of art. Not at ease, this is though the
artistic condition as a disease, unease, which is to be dealt with, hidden, not
-solved by the writing, as
important, whether it be good or bad,
and the same could be said of speech,
yet both are obviously empty- in themselves. They too quickly replace the
disease, the disruption with an empty promise. The text disrupts the subject with its objectivity
at the cost of this subjective space, at
the cost of the subject’s subject ,if this is declined, refused, and silence not entered into, there is something significant here, it
is the opening of the text to thought,
and thought to the text. Opening up of thought to itself, like an embrace. The
embrace that both signifies and is its own subject, we are left with the feeling
which language now embraces before a textual problem a problem opens itself to
the idea of problem, and the idea of problem to the problem itself, which is
present. The referent. Now why is it that the problems idea is hostile towards
its referent, is all language the same. Behind this inscribed hostility is a
person, who wishes to naturally overpower.
D
(Lets
write towards this, this referent, without violence that wishes to establish a
permanence which prevents this.)
(The
purpose of this is subordinate. Too simple to be pragmatic or symbolic on some
other text, or thing. )
Writing
has always been about something written or something other - not of itself, but
of the referent of this presence. Not a description, words, or a description of
itself, as text. Or what text is. What then is this referent, open, lacking in
violence of presence, giving in to itself and anything other. This referent is
that which denies itself to itself and so is the prime cause. That is in simple
naming and complex metaphysics .
(Language's
presence and permanence is a presence,
as is all objects, including art objects - even when they do not signify a
referent they offer a pretence of objective presence , permanent presence. )
Is a
thought reciting, or has it a dynamic before the confrontation with the idea of
an object, before it can be referred to. And how is it to be referred to, how
is it, its status to be treated, sustained, in the past it was convenient to
replace it with a sign. And this is not
to recourse to emotive gestures, but complex dynamic systems, a language must
be as subtle as this. We have written out simplistic objects and now we are
re-writing writing.
There
are two sources of instability, one logo-philosophical the other
aesthetic-ethic, of consciousness. From the later we do not create or judge
objects but create the spaces for itself, its presence in whatever form, or
not. This space has a structure which
is ontologically missing, absent, not even deferred- or is it in anyway
transcendental. It feels incomplete which may provoke an activity towards it
which is destructive - and contrary to what is provoked. That is its
representation must be in a shifting - a moving- which is possible only now in
a certain linguistic light. Literature is fixed and so cannot move in this
space. Philosophy destroys it - yet there is nothing philosophically
mysterious, imaginary, arbitrary about it, its ethics are our ethics its
aesthetic the same, of what could be called instability, the mutability of
consciousness in the first case, its move towards something in the second, a
move towards a lie, all texts lie.
The
need to be positive imposes new tasks on words. One is certain of this
incompleteness, because of the impossibility of completion, without completing
something else which is then lost to us.
E
On
method.
As
historically text structuralizes thought, the avoidance of thinking in a
certain way becomes the avoidance of
writing as representation, our problem then is best expressed in
writing, can only be expressed as both being complex, deferred, unstable, and
present in its activity which leaves an unstable mark, in writings uncertainty and complexity. This
is not to engage in the meaning of writing
but the meaning of thought, the thinking of thought, as an opened meaning of the prior graphical,
objective thought, the problem of meaning is not the problem of knowing what
one means, this knowledge is always a postori and
closes the activity of thought, and so we
use meaning in a way more than
its historical sense, keeping its
historic sense but bringing to it the history of consciousness and its
presence, of thought before the event, and not as yet some idea or
episteme, and specifically in cases
where this involves the presence of ethical and aesthetic consciousness then
this is what I will call art.
We
then push words - with all they still have and are, into a space on which they
need to work harder than before, we overload them now with our self, in this creative, and not created space which
is always new, we allow them to become creative, this creation must also now be new, as we are, be
new, the word must first uncreate itself to begin to
express itself, and through this our self,
the presence of itself, first disappears, is disappearing, is a presence
, this presence a disappearing of itself, before someone, me, names it, and so
before I name anything, even myself.
F
The
actuality, of this intention without an object, or objectivity, perhaps is present as it changes, not in a state
change, but rather in the sense of a changing state, one that is never static,
and so never one, a none state, before it becomes useful, the activity of this
intention, not its object its destination, but the word itself must be altered
to reverse its direction to the changing nature it can hold or express, which
it is given, to which it pulls away
from, doesn’t hold but handle, altering and
so is a good word to use here. We say it behaves eventually like an
object, but we must not fail to engage even in the impossibility of the object,
which we are pressured already to leave our original thought, that which made
the art is removed, absented for something other, a thing of truth, and of value. /or other such mythic / idealities-
the whole materialist - determinist
value system is based on this fallacy,
the value of anything including the object itself, it is that there
always has been the alternative to the production of the object of value, the
uncompleted intention, the actuality of the act becoming something else, never
being itself, (a denial of ontologisms ontology- leaving ontology static for a
moment!- though perhaps we shouldn’t - firstly a denial is used as an alternative which has to not
see its other for a moment in order to
generate itself, into a being, which is both a thing and a becoming) which is
to the word an act of freedom and creation, something new, a creation which
continually creates itself, yet never achieves this, leaving the space for its
and anything others, future. (time here can be thought of the present’s movement towards not being
here, without this failure of ontology and
existence nothing would exist)
the art act, this act represents an instantiation of this.
and successfully now - the immediacy not its
instantiated object - there is no object- It is both closed off on its own and
yet produces, is the act of producing the next process, otherwise nothing
including the art - would exist, art's production here is always guaranteed,
but always objectless, still to gain a value, always possible. What is produced is different- only by virtue
of a conceptualizing it as an object, as such it can gain a value, and this is
a description of something other than this, which is then open to deconstruction,
philosophizing, critically evaluation and comodification
etc.
G
this
text now opens itself into a space which was already present, and we do not decide on some object, even the
impossibility of an object, this is not considered. The text is distributed, is formed by the
thought, and distributed by the thought, altered by the thought, in this way
and not a formative critique of the thought, it does not formulate the thought,
the thought persists as something undefined by the text, and so the text does
not define even itself.
Now
this de-ontologizes but as yet we have no subject ,
we borrow - an object, in our case 'art', and place it into our subject as the
intention of the thoughts content not its intention. We can say more - that
this resembles a problem, but one without a solution or the desire of a
solution. One again can generalize a metaphysics of sorts from this, of the
sort which changes itself into not just a multiplicity, but a process, a number
of parallel events rather than a singularity.
we
can regard history as being absent, as if it is present its present as
something which prevents history.
H
"Why
a text of a particular subject would need to be seen as being empty is in order
not to have a reflexive permanent content or even one which is or can be
regarded in the light of future textual analysis. "
within
this, our practice the text will always be open to its particular subject and
in order to do so will need to empty itself, or maybe at least to a hostile
reader appear to do so! - to be an abstract
class for the subjects world
space, it cannot then be either public,
or static, which would remove, or allow removal, modification etc. of
its particular instantiation , and so allow further reuse, reevaluation,
interpretation , analysis and deconstruction- of its content - world space, and
not just its abstract methods (there are non), as seen here. That the class, this class, container is deconstructable doesn’t effect the subject which is now
separated to what might appear logically to have generated it, though in our
case this reversed, logically or gramatologicaly,
though not in the non history - pre history of the subjective phenomenon, the
source of the text becomes a
instantiation which is hidden to the empty generative class and others which it
creates, which even generates itself,
and as such can take part in a history of analysis etc. as well as safely instantiating its subject, to the extent that
the subject is allowed to be itself, regarding itself as an instantiation of
its own life world not determined by external logics, grammar, rules bases etc.
For instance in relation to its class which it generates and which is so a
generative class itself, of itself and others.
The
nature of this class and its supposed inheritance and types in the subjective
post- theoretical text is reversed, however this in an anti histro-ontological
sense must also at some point have been or is the case. The move from subject -
object - subjects- is its product, and here the original subject's content is
removed or hidden to a critical or hostile reader. It is therefore not the case
of demanding specifics if this is only in order to remove them - modify etc. we
have placed a special signification in the instant, and one we have said is
problematic, and here formally problematic, one then cannot be describable. Such descriptions are other
objects, real objects, non problematic in form, in logic, in reality, in
metaphysics, maybe, but our initial problematics
form, here in this, can derive a class,
narrative etc.- a generalized class, but
not one capable of producing a critique of it, from some external and
therefore illegality, or open it to illegal alteration etc, or even create it,
as a text. The point here is the abstract nature of our subjects types of
problematic.
The properties
of these subjective classes, methods etc, is that they can have, and do have
multiple different instances with their own life worlds unlike some universal
overarching, and legitimizing, limiting , class or narrative i.e. a determinist
object, typical of modernity.
I
A
brief note to begin..
where
or when such things developed is an historical interest- morphology,
overloading- or hiding of the object, in theory - the synthetic productions of
extreme parallelism et al. are
historical events within some structure - both- all- generated out of a
particular instantiation- and not of a class, or culture, as a productive, pragmatic , capitalist move- the devolvement of hierarchies - networks
of various and varying topologies, being actively open to historicizing
or being regarded as ontologically present in the past or present or
not...-etc. There is yet to be information- this is defined from instances in the form of generalizations, which
produces symbols, signs, language,
formality and images, tautologies
logics, aesthetic screens and finally in
this process, this list, epistemologies etc. which is an attempt at a formal
generalization- of a 'metaphysical' instance. Such a description in itself
could be constructed by reference to an instance- in fact all such
generalizations need to be made specific with regard to their genesis, and seen
therefore less than they actually appear,
language needs to degeneralize itself and
rediscover its subject. Otherwise it becomes a legal instrument for the
prevention of genesis. - life - experience- process creativity etc.
J
'or
should we consider art as a private language '
Essentially
there is only one listener.
Who
is it that listens and why, it might be said we listen to familiarize the self
- lets compare this to game playing, entertainment or education, having 'pet'
theories, and detailed knowledge of given facts. If we wish to explore truth,
and thought, and why should we, what would be wrong in not doing so, - we need
not to direct thought and consciousness at its own instability but use this as
a method of experience of the general….,
in any private language, a private language as language without a
reader, the excuse for such thinking would validate itself now, which it does
so, must do, the compromise occurs only in simple social communications - which
legitimate the power of the word, sign, over the signified individual.
Given
a reader what we then explore are the limits of communication at its most
abstract, any audience revolves around the prospects of fascism, and these problematics - socio-economic -cultural. etc.
Removing
these - we still are faced with the continuing problem - that is what as I can
I do, and what difference this makes, what difference anything makes in some
teleology.
Which is a solution to the working out of the
problematic, far from being a sterile phenomenon it is productive, unlike the
socio-artistic-conceptualist -etc which inevitably after failing logically -
implicit or explicitly- abandons meaning for elegance.
The
movement has been to amalgamate the synthetic in avoidance of the logical
object to subjective narration, avoiding
the hierarchies of questioning which supposed an answer, but a narration
of the many problematics - which is both art and the
life-world - cosmos,
avoiding
metaphysics and such nonsense, which then is not complete but a mark,
signification etc. but narration is only an excuse here at signifying the
proto-world before objects, which is hidden by the sediments of language, logic
and meaning, and against a belief in such devices with their teleological
implications.
K
'That
nothing makes a difference.'
We do not need to consider the so called
objects of communication in art which
fail to make a difference to the psychological being of the
phenomenological presence of what has been called the iconography of art -
before its logos - and neither the appearances, images, texts grammars etc. -
after the epoche - which is after this moment, - we
would say prior to perception- are differences seen- these objects fail to
difference consciousness- the phenomenology of being - present in the
subjective subject which- this - we call here art, - rather
the logical structures have been seen both in short terms and in its
histories to change - and so articulate - signify - in this subjective
revealing of their fictions as objects of the conscious field, of developing an ontology, in which case we
see ontologies as pseudo-ontologies
as subjects of private iconographies - which appear never to change.
We
can as what others have called the / what we would like to call deep/
phenomenological epoche before sign and signifier -
before ontology and metaphysics, history etc, this landscape of the particular before its actual
description - before it particularizes itself - or is made into an event - as it in it's self consciousness is always
identical - with itself- always different to anything else- even when it is an
historical event - of remembering, could be considered as a iconographic act,
it is - here called art - but elsewhere philosophy etc. and we might consider
such an answer to be that its presence is not iconographically
opaque - but resides as a universal potential.
This is not
a drawn description, it is not a history, not a raw phenomenon , and
that then goes for any signification, beyond the subjects subject - as art
which could be described not in morphological terms - reusing the language of
morphology etc, but in a new language which could be thought of as art as i.e.
non signified private language activity- or not - but something far wider - far
more complex.
L
We have described the position
regarding logics before the epoche in the
phenomenological event as being absent and non foundational, and the dangerous
consequences of theory, the old syntactic and semantic rules etc., the use of
which is so fatal to subjects which could be described as being empty ,i.e. the
history of art and language. With the - so called - but not- empty subjective
space the free play can and does allow in certain circumstances - i.e. performative acts etc. - the 'whatever it means to you is
what it means' approach, typically cited in
post-modernity, which occurs for what may be a number of reasons,
which however is not a singular approach if we regard the ethics which are in very simple terms
present in the very act of intentionality, seeing, destabilization, instability,
phenomenological presence, as presence
of a wish or desire ,want, need, etc.
We are then in being honest open to
judgment, and in turn offering judgment which communicates prior to meaning and
theory etc, prior to symbolic evaluation,
which is a significant externality, as well as an internality and such
judgments being ethically based are free of tautology, are flexible, unstable
themselves, which is here a good, not a
bad thing. We can now see how fixed rules, old syntactic and semantic rules,
etc, simply wont do in regards to the world.
The alternative pragmatic free play - anywhere- but especially
throughout all of what is called post modernity is essentially hedonistic, the
'whatever it means to you is what it means' of post-modernity, is hedonistic.
In placing ethics before this, it forces a limit on the pragmatic and opens a
space in the hedonistic pragmatic field in which once again perhaps we can
communicate, that is recognize the difference, the instabilities, between
others but primarily first in establishing ourselves, as subjective, dynamic
entities, and so remember and so avoid the downside of the 'whatever it means
to you is what it means', a kind of
eventual chaos from which one is unable to escape, to the extent that even the
subject becomes lost. There can be no art here even as absence, (want, need,
etc which elsewhere is called instability) for what may or may not be possible,
as even when non realization is concrete the wish, desire etc, is effectively
dealt with by the propositions of pragmatism.
The morality of intention, position,
description, state, desire, wish etc,
without which it wouldn’t be is yet
another parallel thread.
i should note - though
personally there is no need- that the status of "can", is sufficient, a possibility is sufficient,
as even its provisional state attributes itself, this problem then doesn’t
arise, the pragmatic response if it chooses, is to ignore this, to completely
remove it, and so effectively remove everything, and this is why Post-modernity is
amoral, it seeks stability and attempts
to fix itself, even in its free play. This ethics arises from this, lack of
permanent presence, intention, position, description, state, desire,
instability, wish etc. ,it is
there, as an ethics, a morality, but one
which is self aware.
Does this then impose itself on us. i don’t think it does - for then it would destroy this, its
own instability .This morality is from
outside. The best name.. A society - is this? .. It is irrelevant to ...the
actuality of each day, each deconstruction, lack of permanent presence, etc.
Any text tries to stabilize this instability and so it is not ethical, as is
any text which opens itself to free play etc.
Meaning, answers, questions, provide solutions and these are not
moral activities. You can not do
anything with this given instability. It destabilizes itself yet fails to
remove itself - replaces itself with something else which is itself unstable,
incapable of Becoming form, as each form materializes it remains, as an
instability.
The problem of art is not simple,
simplistic notions just wont do. The phenomenological activity, the epoche, is internal and in all cases is yet to open itself
to logic, or philosophical problemizing, it is then a
complex problem. It is a problem of intention. To intend to problematize
is the causality of modernity, within our work now there is no causality, there
is non i think generally in phenomenology anyway. The
intention and the problem coexist, in a manner which is not causual,
non teleological. The coexistence
outside of causality avoids the conclusion of an object. Such complex parallism avoids the lack of dimensionalities of logic. But
this is getting prescriptive or descriptive of the very unfixed problematic
state. We do not need to use words in new ways. We need to avoid prescriptive
logics and clever tricks. External ideas. we are still in the wrong mental set,
still looking
but what we can do is a decisive step
away from even intention and problem, otherwise we are bound to these by some
causal logic, some ethics of empiricism, of phenomenologisism.
And here we can as it were we use
language differently.
intentionality is the
product of a primitive instability. It follows
that all texts are provisionally unstable. what is it then which singles this out.
Firstly its reluctance to take this on, secondly its own intention as an
intention. This looks like tautology, but it isn’t in that it distances itself
from itself and differentiates itself from itself.
The moment of recognition of the
problematic of distancing in intention is a phenomenological event before the
decisive act, which in this case apriori will not
become decisive, the decision is this recognition of what becomes, what always
is unrecognizable what is not accurately casually describable.
I can see a potential criticism in a
lack of difference, and such a problematic might be considered as a new
subject, a good thing , a new source of discussion, however its really a kind
of metaphysical criticism, and we are operating beneath this, before it. And so
the first answer, a metaphysical answer, is that we are not doing metaphysics, though there
might Be an analogous opportunity in metaphysics. There are I think however
other answers which do not depend
on any metaphysical critique.
I suppose a logical one is simply
that we will only find identity in an ideality,
and we are seeing the
destabilization of our intention as not
a consequence of our intentionality towards an ideality
but as a deliberate act, of a phenomenological epoche
which subjectively is always different.
The refusal to give in to
logical difference, or not, is a refusal
to engage with the metaphysics of logic or the logic of logic.
There are others, from elsewhere we
know that the play of difference de
stabilizes a status quo, the signified , the
signifier is the play of difference.
That
identicalities are, is an aporia,
The identity of indecernables
maybe like wise and the contradictions of the eternal return etc. Our difference however lies in the relation
of our problematic towards itself, firstly recognizing it as described as an
internal destabilizing source and so deliberately before this logical - empirical
destabilization takes place, intending a prior
destabilization as a phenomenological intention, and this has to Be different. even before logic
establishes its difference, or the phenomenological realization does as we
intended it in the first place, destabilization is always present, always different. If it were not then we have an ideality, which is firstly impossible, but more importantly
not wanted, not present, as its presence would remove the problematic. That is the old mistake.
The space in which this specific
language describes its subject is uncertain, as is the ability for any
descriptive process to take place. This was termed our problem, and by others
seen as a final act of some reductionist step. The
examination or re-examination of such texts is another activity in its
self. A text may have to have a subject
- a pre text - and yet in itself can develop other subjects, this is where we
might differentiate ourselves from some deconstructionist program of making
something new. Our pre textual intention is art as not a reductive questioning,
which borrows much from analytical philosophy, but as a destabilizing process,
recognizing itself and it simultaneous
subject. the goal here is not an
ontological destabilization, and not the destabilizing of something, anything
else. Its fairly obvious why this should
be so, the move towards abstraction is as good an example as any where
Destabilizing the ontology may well be seen as the problematic. Or in
conceptualism... But as soon as we realize the problematic the artwork is
realized and completed. Yet a repetition or copy of this work is no longer
considered art is perhaps the result of
the removal of the problematic and not the primacy of a solution. The primacy
of solution paradigm was effectively removed by the failure or success of
conceptualism which in effect nullified the idea of art. It became an ideality. Anyway
without the problematics of art there would be no
art. This very thing is after all what
we want, what the whole thing is about. The insight is sufficient to see how
then it is possible to continue. Historically but not presently Each time we find a problem it is a case or
possible site for how we deal with its actuality. Modernism mistakenly
attempted an analysis , a kind of enlightenment ethic, one in which
understanding mapped the limits of the cosmos, we could do art, the evidence of
this is still in the museums. A conceptual critique of this only refined art
into the problem of art to be dealt with. Not other problems for Intentional
activities do not occupy physical spaces and problems within them are not
concepts or theory. We do not have to prove our questioning here, or is it an
empty question, remember we had an intention, a motive for doing this. This problem may well be an indication of the
scale, an infinite scale, of the difference between the ideality
and the intention. I am not concerned with the ontology of the ideality, or any special supposition which we can place in
the most pessimistic of places, but with the danger of some self satisfied
description. This simply will not do, is disrupted by all kinds of
externalities, but the artistic move here is our intention to disrupt it
ourselves. Or better at the same time finding this.. Ontology, of any kind, has
absolutely nothing to do with art from our point of view, as an artist. The phenomenology of the question -not why we question - is the artistic act. The question has a content not based around
this ideality of art and our attitude towards it, it
is there already fully developed. Our attitude towards it is not as an ideality, we simply cant compare, it's another’s problem,
with no stable epistemological framework, no doubt as serious a problem as ours
is. The framework itself appears as a
transcendental question. And this is wrong from an art practice point of view,
it must be reversed, we are again
attempting to say something about art as ideality,
yet what is actually happening is
something to do with our intentionality, it's the cause of our problem, its
obvious that it is, we feel it so. There
could be all kinds of reasons for these problems, as exposed by analysis,
philosophy etc. and there might in principle be a way of dealing with them,
from outside, or we could simply
pragmatically ignore them, but here is our move as artist, we want a
particular problem to be a phenomenological instance, we intended this to be
so. Any acceptance stops our activity.
There is no need to underline this act as a kind of objective framing.
All previous ideas of transcendence, overcoming, re-stating, refining, making,
etc are not questioned, but the intentionality is so framed as to open itself
to itself , and not some other problem. That is our aim is not an arbitrary
questioning or revision, our aim moves no further than itself as question. This
is a very particular kind of question empty of any content except itself, and
that is why it cant be answered and that is why is can be validated if it needs
to be. Each time the moment of this question is realized we have another site
for an art work. It is never though some intention at ideality,
it has been realized in post-reductionism terms that it is itself which is the
only possibility.
Intentionalities may be regarded as some
objective ideality, but I would not like to do so here. There is no value in
this, what I want is not a foundation building exercise, this quickly looks
like tautology if it keeps to some set of consistent rules. This new space is
uncertain, the process disruptive. And neither do we want imaginary objects, if
everything is provisional then its that which we need to destabilize. It
appears I am doing something I cant do, not just setting up things to be
knocked down or are we making
progressive systems.
Language is once again at the service
of experience, and not supplying any donotic insight
or bags of rules. The mistaken confusion was elaborated so that the method
became the arbiter, the confusion was and is real, the problematic also, and
the interplay between the various significant systems something quite other,
the problematic is both pre and post linguistics, things like meaning and use.
The awareness of the problematic was never intended first as being useful, it
is after all a morphological feature in the past. How meaning, words, work here
is radicalized and not random. Syntactically if allowed to run its course
language eventually empties itself. But
these problematic of meaning exposed the remaining phenomenology of the real,
and what well call the intentional subjective problematic of art, once the
structures of meaning in language are removed. That is this is not a question
but the presence of absence, elsewhere described as instability, absence of ideality, recognition of the possible presence of an ideality yet still intending it. The criteria for
impossibility and contradiction being removed not by the failure of language
but by the continuation of our wish to hold on to this unresolved, unresolveable.... A
captured image of a movement which removes itself in its movement.
We have moved beyond process of destabilization
as casual intentionality into actual destabilization as an apriori.
So we have removed the worry of what to do, the difficulty of what to do,
causality is planning and planning gives
rise to causality, and causality gives rise to objects, whether material or not
as signifiers of something which cannot be signified, in a field of truth
mapped by untruths.
Language as meaning is only one
object among others, and meaning is a finality. An excuse. The reuse of it in evidencing these unstable phenomenologisims
could be described as representing a new abstraction of representationalism. It is then seen philosophically, where
old philosophy looked for meaning and stability, as negative phenomenology, a
negative philosophy though not anti-philosophical.
The philosophical here is used as
another analogy of what we are doing. We talk about the problems of philosophy
, the problems of art, as something to be solved, something to be dealt with,
yet the word arises after the fact and logic after the word...
This is not to dismiss logic or
language as a pragmatic structure. No matter how well it accounts something
remains which is not a wish, romantic, mystical presence, but can be described as a problematic presence towards which our intentionality can not causally be placed. They remain layered together outside of a,
the, sentence with absent ideality etc etc, in no
conceptual chain. The problematic destabilizing itself, its ontology, its
epistemology, etc etc. . After all surely it must do
that.
Intentionality and the exposure of is
problematic could be described as a descriptive attempt which does not engage
in art activity, but this is a naive approach, if the activity was to set
itself as the area for the problem to
exist in it would play a role.
However when we focus on this problem
we see it is not a problem at all in any ordinary sense. Or is it a casual process. Now I am not engaging in a kind of metaphysics about this
non objective non subjective intended, having dismissed the ideality
as an impossible intention, it is no longer the impossibility of the intention
towards an ideality which is a cause of failure. Only
historically. An historical naivety which is beside the point, we cant really
say anything like this, as its about this that
we do not concern ourselves without concerning ourselves with ontology. Or are we drawing up lists, we are
engaging in the actual activity of an intention towards art. Other things of
course appear, we are not naive purists, or boring tautologists.
Or can we abstract some kind of formulae- such as ……... Its not a question of
epistemology. There is neither a multiplicity or a singularity. This not a pre chaotic state of undifferentiates
which appears post analytically, but the result of an intentional act towards a
ideality. Not (a subjectification
of the object or attempt at objectivity, the ideal remains an impossibility,
the subjective remains as a totality. But there is no point to this. We have
chaos- subjectivity, pragmatics, wishful thinking, and the impossible idealality. We regard the ideality
as a site of failure of both subject, and
object. However we are not bothered with (this) failure.
The event around idealities
and language, of pragmatics and their limits regarding idealities
has first pragmatically removed idealities from
consideration by some, but by others placed them in an unreachable location,
and importantly opened up the ground between the absolute of the ideality and the pragmatics of the subject. This has to be
a generalized ground at its limits- at the ideal, but between such convergent idealities we have an intentional space which can have
titles such as art philosophy science ,
mathematics etc. The intentionality
moves us from the pragmatics of a null subjectivity into this field. There is
no reason for this to be a negative field but we need to be aware of the nature
of this fields instability, it is essentially unstable, neither a subjective
pragmatic, which can be fixed, a decision, or an actual impossible ideality. The metaphysics of this instability is
interesting but surely it is undecideable as to their
causalities.
What we have are the intentional spaces which we have
described above, spaces which are essentially unlimited.
It now requires us to see how such
essentialities can themselves be destabilized, are destabilizing. This is
relatively simple, an simple intentionality will do.
Elsewhere texts have attempted a critical and positive step from a multiplicity of possibilities- which are
not considered as objects, writing, communications, internalities, and these texts have exposed these themes. To
re-examine these would be like going backwards to synthesize an object out of
its fragments. But already we have fallen victim to objectivity. What we have
discovered as essential is a critical
subjectivity of destabilization.
Superficially it might be
difficult to see anything wrong with this , however in not doing so we might be seen to be replacing
its move, one of destabilization with another objectivity, or attempted
objectivity, or illusion of an objectivity. We might once again find ourselves
in a determinist descriptive world trying to do things such as figure out what
art is.
the powerful lessons learnt, the
significant discoveries of the absence of the art object was a reductionism and
objective fact. Its the nature of this fact which can despite its apparent
negativity ensure the very thing we want. A destabilizing activity, a
subjectivity attaching itself to subjectivity in order to objectify
itself. The condition of pseudo theories
such as other texts, is such that they can appear to objectify themselves in order to be effective and so their very
success is a failure. Inhibiting other
texts, and being essentially now a dead object. Such writing as other art
before, essentially closes down everything. And we can dream up any number of
sentences of the kind which point things out , even negatively. Self
destabilization might be thought to be an ideal, but only in the sense that idealities are simply not allowed. A trite recourse to
failed idealities misplaces or replaces the dynamics
of non textual, non prescriptive discussion, activities etc. That something is
said actualizes a destabilizing feature is only a logical and not artistic process.
That offering meaning or abdicating it is also I think wrong. To ask What are
your intentions is the response to this,
intetionalization cuts things off, stops them
straight away, what things of course, neither. Both. Not neither but not in
some middle ground, there has to be a radical use of language here which avoids
certain placements, maybe all placements.
To cite something else is a grounding
and therefore a bad move, a halting move. What’s wrong then is this, this very
agreement.
We should not cite the... as pun on site. There is no site. Neither is
there a non-site. Such sentences are
difficult and potentially dangerous. We
need something not closed off, open , dynamic, non coding in a fixed
way. The very play of codability non codabilty is not our business, it is just that we find this
is a potential problem in misunderstanding the kind of structure we have, and
how the word structure is being used.
perhaps It is the non objectivity
of the texts focus and not the texts non objectivity, disability, which is
important. Any textual disability is besides the point. The real de-stability
here - is here already, and wanted , but here already.. There are numerous
things of uncertainty here. Intention, reality, subject, aporia
of action. We break open the question, we don’t question it in some hall of
mirrors fashion, or remove it. We have
radicalized the geography of the sentence and its causal chains, as they are
responsible for placing stability as a universal. and we are then in this new place. Such a
position has no relation to an object, is neither outside or inside the object, the object
becomes not unbounded but its boundaries are no longer binding.
It is the essential activity which only appears contradictory if we
regard words such as ‘problem’ as meaning something quite specific, i.e. Not
problematic. This fault is to be sorted out elsewhere, but here it does not name but generates the problem as itself. The record of this, the reading of this
is not a de coding , problem to
solution, which implies a set possibilities of success, yet the success of this
here now has been assured in its own intention , and its own uncertainty is the
guarantee and proof. We move on to
uncertainty and intention.
From a causal point of view and
ignoring (I can I think borrow a term here - under erasure) both matter, and media* , we can move on to
examine the play of logic and meaning,
and here we can question meaning as it relates to art, or, and art practice , we should return
to this and or.... what occurs …… here
at this point is a splitting, as opposed
to a synthesis, (a very non dialectical move, an alternative dialectical move
subsumes everything into the absolute...There art and every specificity
disappears ) and at such a split the opportunity to move in two directions
occurs, we have choice rather than a synthesis, yet perhaps only one of these
can now validate the artist and
art. .. Only one of these non synthetic
choices is now - has now become - or is becoming - the artistic move. A
separating out of a particular intention.
(Later and elsewhere the meaning of meaning is itself split,
deconstructed, etc.) What is left on the other side of our question of the
meaning of art from the question of meaning
could be called a place for art activity to take place. Is always the
place it takes place. A conditional hiving off is a disruptive destabilizing
activity in which where the one side relates to a move towards art is
questionably art, the other to other objects etc. We pursue , now historically, the process through ontology
towards a negativity, but this too can be destabilized, fragmented, questioned.
And again a split occurs and a choice has to be made. This now appears like an
endless and logical causal chain, it is perhaps the play of logic into
meaninglessness, an exposure of meanings
inability to mean anything- even nothing- a metaphysics of nothing, and or a
metaphysical failure, it is always attempting to capture what is outside,
and a decisive choice here has to be
based on our initial and continued intention- and it this in causal terms which
is what accounts for its non-philosophical move, away from problems of being -
Metaphysics etc
A move which was not a move but an
exposure of what was already present, and the intentionality which remains in
this presence. I would call this a non pragmatic move as it does not any longer
have any ideas about solutions.
In this non pragmatic move into a space
outside of pure subjectivity? Or not -
in the senses or arbitrariness,
pure objectivity or intentional objectivity, we do not become involved in philosophy, even
a radical philosophy - a philosophy which perhaps can also occupy such a space, or become involved with trivial
objects. Dead cows for instance. I make these points here to avoid any confusion
as to what we are doing or better intending,; intention is here may well be
crucial.
Where we are now is beyond the word
itself as something stable, and beyond
the instabilities which Modernity either failed to deal with, or discovered,
such as how things and substances differentiate themselves, that there is here a particular thing before
its name could be particularized. How this coalesced how it can be de-
coalesced, and through ideas of instability
in communication taking place,
how these are questioned etc. Therefore the position of the word the text, the
before or after the word as something definite, we do not single out, or use
this as a critique or a methodology or better an intentionality that we already
had, this itself, is now not as it was,
an imaging, a means of producing a set
of propositions.
Numerous structures now disappear, which can
be, have and are being critically
considered, this as opposed to a negation, a negative reductionist
move, there dissapperance leaves a presence. (Without
meaning, meaningless too disappears, nihilism is the product, a result of
logic.)
The ideas that are essentially
against this negative, reductionist move need
not be followed, we can consider these structuralist,
outside art with their own problematics. If we consider all reductionist
moves might arrive at dead ends, they destabilize reading and logic, and this
removes them, does not put them under
erasure, regarding art activity, the move in art which apparently arrived
at a dead end, is removed. This is one
removal, from outside. The second more radical removal is internal and simply rejects reductionisms
conclusion, after allowing it, on the empirical evidence, there is something
still present. Even if it were not we could intend it. what was exposed in reductionism was a
displacement of idealities, now the location of these
may be regarded as a dead end
if one regards the absolute ideality as a
possible reality, or as achievable, but now its removal or arrival has not
removed our intention or ability to do so. Its removal, or arrival has made it
possible to defend ourselves from being called unreasonable, or meaningless, as
in it total presence there is something else, or a possible intention, and in
its absence there is a presence or possible intention.
And so we have a very limited pretext in which to work, because of the
removal of certain spaces, structures, logics et al. Spaces
between perfect - (and non realizable) idealities,
and complete but pragmatic subjectivities.
Any number of destabilizing texts may appear, and appear possible
and we can admire these, appreciate
these but we are now as it were underneath them. They are destabilized by our
intention - which we now see which is neither pragmatically fixed or ideally
fixed. The very failure of
modernity which produced such an
instability such un certainty gave us a methodology - and importantly showed an
alternative, perhaps in its own
confusion gave us the opportunity to see that the problematic of art remained,
and we wanted it to remain, we actually liked and like it.
As for the pragmatics of stabilization, justification within
post-modernism, these old forms are ok, they have in the face of the
destabilization chose to ignore what was empirically exposed, which I
think in effect has been to ignore art
as an intentional activity.
It may be a legitimate move to not
become involved in other activities - but certainly if we avoid the problematics regarding art, we avoid art altogether.
*This ignoring is a token for a
complex activity of analysis perhaps best regarded from other disciplines. The
term is not pejorative either externally or internally. But importantly we are
not ignoring our particular intentionality.
Any text sets out to say something in
a certain denotative way must be suspect with regards to art activity.
We do not want to talk about the problematics of text, or texts, here. Art has
consistently refused to engage in the problematics of any given text, theme or subject. In
particular it seems to locate only to draw attention to what it is not, only to
displace these objects, text or not. From an art point of view the textual structures like any other structures are of
no concern in themselves, in their histories, this is even at the extreme of ignoring the truth, or
radically not having any serious regard for
the technicalities of any science, semiotics etc, such as even the
status of the signifier and the signified. Their relationships, status, histories
etc. This is why I have said elsewhere we have in comparison a radicalization
of the use of language. However the text here, is not through its formalities in error regarding art, its error must be
elsewhere, actually in its stability. This does not mean that the textual move
was a mistake, those who have called such a move a blind alley were I think
mistaken. It was the only possible route
away from the physical object art object paradigm. The so called failure in textuality was in a way to be expected the same kind of
thing happened elsewhere when chasing such absolutes. So also To engage in
semantic meaning, or nonsense, or poetics is mistaken even if it is not a blind
alley, as is analysis of any kind whatever, psychological, philosophical,
metaphysical etc.
Formally the texts records - badly -
but its the best we can do - the art practice, its properties then are
irrelevant, relevant is, or better was,
the ability to pose in text a question. Distinguishing itself as text
was irrelevant to art, so text is mere
pragmatics, and that is why it becomes radicalized. What can be said as a
detailed questioning, critical,
responsive process etc cannot be
achieved in other media, where we see the - you see what you want attitude
regarding gallery objects, the
gallery situation was only ever a very primitive formal
presentation of completed stable objects. The objects here are closed,
anthropomorphically dead, and speechless. But another possibility is that of
speech, the relationship of text to speech need not concern us - in the face of
other media the questions that are raised are phonetic, whether speech or
writing, it is the structural purpose as use which was important and still is,
that is significant in pushing the problematic of art further, we could look at
the question, the thought, But not to- again- question its process but to show
its failure. to phrase this positively, this becomes what art is, as seen,
experienced.
the radicalization of this language is the result of the radicalization
of the art activity,
How is it that idealities
became a problem is resolved in their
position as problems. Art - as art may
function as some semiotic / philosophic or pseudo-philosophic tool,
whatever art as art means, outside yet
defending this tendency and such an activity might be
socially very useful, but so might be our radicalization. we are after
all trying. Whatever, I am not heading towards some wonderful derridaian autonomy, even if , and I doubt it, it happens.
Ones own psychological position is difficult; which is symptomatic but in no
way conclusive. Whatever. Is it like this or like that, whatever, it is
specific. And here is something someone might say is an original and positive
statement. Although specification is kind of boundary drawing. We must move on.
we must avoid solutions, why? Why cant
these equally become radicalized. This after all could be called a
solution. this activity - which is art -
is fundamentally illuminating in the nature of things. It might from outside
validate its morphology.
So if we are not satisfied with this,
how psychologically fatal this would be.
"doubt can exist only where a question exists" Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus
Firstly and historically, 'art' is the
instability of its own definition, the instability of its signifier and the
instability of its signified. Secondly art in late modernism - in
conceptualism, is the instability of the
ideas around its ontology.. Whether this reflects a cultural, philosophical ,
biological , or even cosmological - metaphysical - fact, is besides the point
from an art point of view. The artist engages in the instability, is its actor.
The mistake, and part of the de-stabilization , is looking for final
definitions. And of course now here is such a mistake. But allusions to
philosophy -biology - history - art history - culture - parody - humor - politics are
even more besides the point. we do not define either negatively or
positively, but create the instability, or rather point it out in the now
present, now present text. This text's status as art is (then) essentially
unstable?
Critically we are caught between logical certainties and
methodologies - we note Nietzsche - heidegger and derrida's challenges, questioning of truth, logocentricism et al. - or something nonsensical, even
poetic.
That there is a general
epistemological instability is interesting,(outside or above and so inclusive
of art), if art was to be descriptive it would certainly define this general -
philosophical- metaphysical instability - elsewhere called deconstruction. I
might even criticize the term if I was not principally interested here in art, and not here! interested in
philosophy, ontology etc.. The
prima-facie case I will go on to make isn't the historical instability but the
inherent instability here now, and the nature of this, its proper naming, or
inability to do so. The status of this
work as art does not lie in its willingness to be uncertain, unstable, any
critical position is in itself challengeable, I could imbed such a challenge
here, but that it attempts to indicate that the problematic remains no matter
what. Why this defacto or de jour cannot be realized
is obvious- though maybe it should be re stated, its restatement can again be challenged.
Remember Russell's remarks regarding the
tractatus - it throws up an uncertainty as to truth.
Yet here we don’t even have any given criteria
as to the significance of truth, or whatever. We are left with the art
and its ontology having a greater
uncertainty, instability - if you like than philosophy, in Russell's sense, but
perhaps not elsewhere. However its only psychologically reassuring to find
oneself in company, there is no internal assurance as to right or wrong. Both
absolute positions and any other are questionable. And so on and so on.
Perhaps at this point we need to say
more about materials, however such a discussion would be a kind of
anthropological investigation, texts as signs are simple in pragmatic terms.
Specifically its the conceptual instability and not the physical instability
which makes us artists and not physicists, galleries and objects represent
places for the physics of instability to be demonstrated. And restoration does not restore art back to the
object. so I would consider the method of writing firstly as pragmatic, though
there are difficulties with this, in how we write, with regard to meaning as
expressed in language as being casual or logical, problems with the idea of
equivalents etc.
The legitimating of the art practice
has to be in the first place with the artist,
how do you know you are doing art unless you are questioning the
activity , other wise you are probably
doing something quite different and allowing some external definition-
and so some external person as artist.
modern day impressionist painters are
painters, modern day conceptualists are conceptualists
so we need to reject the idea of
concept as art, but still accept the
discussion. The Judd dictum about anyone calling anything art is an excellent
example. It relates to a specific historical destabilizing, and the product of
a new- and Judd’s- position, which is a new definition, or art object. Its
truth or not is not as important as the ability to take up views about it. That
is destabilize its objectivity. In a way he doesn’t know what he is talking
about.
The recognition here is that we cant get
answers which are in anyway fixed. Consumerism maybe demands a pragmatic art,
and that has been typical of post-modernism but in our definition it isn’t art
at all, as its taken the pragmatic step of making a decision, it enters the
gallery- or re-enters- and so there is nothing more to be said , nothing more
to see, nothing more to do, the artistic move here was - if any - the moment of
curatorial decision, however in reality the curatorial position has already
presupposed art and its objects. One
does not re-discover America these days. One might discover something of it,
but any object based curatorial or artist- move is now about objects, and I
include concepts, politics, feminism, et al. And others. In other words not
art. As artists brought in by questioning other things, so they are excluded -
or else everything is included. the
point of the pragmatic inclusive decision is we then have to either discuss it
or not. The objects then are if we do, clearly not the same, we then maybe wish
to back down from this position, but again so long as we are doing the thinking
its us that is realizing the art. The object once this process is over returns
to it original and pre-artistic state. Just as in aestheticism, once no longer
beautiful the object returns to its original state. Once the Beautiful is
separated from art by a questioning process, a raising of doubt in modernity of
the qualification of a objects properties as art we move to other
considerations. However even when the aesthetic was concerned as being an
attribute its nature was also unstable. The de-stabilizing of the material
object-art paradigm was the achievement
of conceptualism.
This was only one in a series of
destabilizations, of representation, of subject, of content etc which was
modernity.
Conceptualists first engaged with the
concept as object. Objectivity
followed to a collapse in the ability to
find a stable conceptual object at all. All this is history, and as such
Belongs in a museum. The move was not made in which Not the concept as object but concept as
process before the object was arrived at. Such a destination is of course outside
of art, which explains why it was avoided.
But the alternative seemed to put an
end to any activity at all, other than subjective and empty gesture. However if
the radical move was made and the subjectivity of post modernity’s rush to make
objects, again, is avoided we are not, as it was thought left with nothing,
left with nothing to do. In removing the historical edifice of modernity we
actually do expose something. At the very minimum a space for intentionality,
which is not the excuse for objects.
The destabilizing process at this point
does not collapse into nothing, for the same reason as the removal of a
philosophical system does not remove its cause, there was a cause and before
this cause gained its causality a presence, and in the absence of a presence
the space for an intention. The failure
of a logical system due to internal inconsistencies does not necessarily remove
the reasons , the intentions for its use, and these need not be some other
inconsistency. Logical, metaphysical, biological, cosmological etc. Its
possible still to want to do something and until we say what it is we cant say
its a mistake.
'Generalizations
-in art and philosophy' where we can
refer to 'this'. and not a specific- and this is maybe sufficient, so sufficient then that specific disciplines, activities
and subjects must too be generalized. Intentionally - is a modified
metaphysics, a modified process or even a modified theology, we are in effect
dealing with de-polymorphic activities, pre conceptual attitudes
etc. - before specifics- is an interesting
area in which to be. /sic/
Missing
- this- as in a consideration of non presence and the need to now show that we
can avoid missing premises is a possible tactic of both this activity and its
simultaneous writing. These become specifics in themselves, and not dialectical
subjects / objects/ we are not interested in dialectics.
'That
nothing makes a difference.' - we do not need to consider the so called objects
of communication in art which fail to
make a difference to the psychological being of the phenomenological presence
of what has been called the iconography of art - before its logos - and neither
the appearances, images, texts grammars etc. - after the epoche
- which is after this moment, - we would say prior to perception- are
differences seen- these objects fail to difference consciousness- the
phenomenology of being - present in the subjective subject which- this - we
call here art, - rather the logical structures have been seen both in
short terms and in its histories to change - and so articulate - signify - in
this subjective revealing of their fictions as objects of the conscious
field, of developing an ontology, in
which case we see ontologies as pseudo-ontologies as subjects of private iconographies - which
appear never to change.
We
can as what others have called the / what we would like to call deep/
phenomenological epoche before sign and signifier -
before ontology and metaphysics, history etc, this landscape of the particular before its actual
description - before it particularizes itself - or is made into an event - as it in it's self consciousness is always
identical - with itself- always different to anything else- even when it is an
historical event - of remembering, could be considered as a iconographic act,
it is - here called art - but elsewhere philosophy etc. and we might consider
such an answer to be that its presence is not iconographically
opaque - but resides as a universal potential.
This is not
a drawn description, it is not a history, not a raw phenomenon , and
that then goes for any signification, beyond the subjects subject - as art
which could be described not in morphological terms - reusing the language of
morphology etc, but in a new language which could be thought of as art as i.e.
non signified private language activity- or not - but something far wider - far
more complex.
'or
should we consider art as a private language '
Essentially
there is only one listener.
Who
is it that listens and why, it might be said we listen to familiarize the self
- lets compare this to game playing, entertainment or education, having 'pet'
theories, and detailed knowledge of given facts. If we wish to explore truth,
and thought, and why should we, what would be wrong in not doing so, - we need
not to direct thought and consciousness at its own instability but use this as
a method of experience of the general….,
in any private language, a private language as language without a
reader, the excuse for such thinking would validate itself now, which it does
so, must do, the compromise occurs only in simple social communications - which
legitimate the power of the word, sign, over the signified individual.
Given
a reader what we then explore are the limits of communication at its most
abstract, any audience revolves around the prospects of fascism, and these problematics - socio-economic -cultural. etc.
Removing
these - we still are faced with the continuing problem - that is what as I can
I do, and what difference this makes, what difference anything makes in some
teleology.
Which is a solution to the working out of the
problematic, far from being a sterile phenomenon it is productive, unlike the
socio-artistic-conceptualist -etc which inevitably after failing logically -
implicit or explicitly- abandons meaning for elegance.
The
movement has been to amalgamate the synthetic in avoidance of the logical
object to subjective narration, avoiding
the hierarchies of questioning which supposed an answer, but a narration
of the many problematics - which is both art and the life-world
- cosmos,
avoiding
metaphysics and such nonsense, which then is not complete but a mark,
signification etc. but narration is only an excuse here at signifying the
proto-world before objects, which is hidden by the sediments of language, logic
and meaning, and against a belief in such devices with their teleological
implications.
Where
we might have said….A brief note to begin.. where or when such things developed
is an historical interest- morphology, overloading- or hiding of the object, in
theory - the synthetic productions of extreme parallelism et al. are historical events within some
structure - both- all- generated out of a particular instantiation- and not of
a class, or culture, as a productive,
pragmatic , capitalist move- the devolvement
of hierarchies - networks of various and varying topologies, being
actively open to historicizing or being regarded as ontologically present in
the past or present or not...-etc. There is yet to be information- this is
defined from instances in the form of
generalizations, which produces symbols, signs,
language, formality and images,
tautologies logics, aesthetic screens
and finally in this process, this list, epistemologies etc. which is an attempt
at a formal generalization- of a 'metaphysical' instance. Such a description in
itself could be constructed by reference to an instance- in fact all such
generalizations need to be made specific with regard to their genesis, and seen
therefore less than they actually appear,
language needs to degeneralize itself and
rediscover its subject. Otherwise it becomes a legal instrument for the
prevention of genesis. - life - experience- process creativity etc.
"Why
a text of a particular subject would need to be seen as being empty is in order
not to have a reflexive permanent content or even one which is or can be
regarded in the light of future textual analysis. "
within
this, our practice the text will always be open to its particular subject and
in order to do so will need to empty itself, or maybe at least to a hostile
reader appear to do so! - to be an abstract
class for the subjects world
space, it cannot then be either public,
or static, which would remove, or allow removal, modification etc. of
its particular instantiation , and so allow further reuse, reevaluation,
interpretation , analysis and deconstruction- of its content - world space, and
not just its abstract methods (there are non), as seen here. That the class, this class, container is deconstructable doesn’t effect the subject which is now
separated to what might appear logically to have generated it, though in our
case this reversed, logically or gramatologicaly,
though not in the non history - pre history of the subjective phenomenon, the
source of the text becomes a instantiation
which is hidden to the empty generative class and others which it creates, which even generates itself, and as such can
take part in a history of analysis etc. as well as safely instantiating its subject, to the extent that
the subject is allowed to be itself, regarding itself as an instantiation of
its own life world not determined by external logics, grammar, rules bases etc.
For instance in relation to its class which it generates and which is so a
generative class itself, of itself and others.
The
nature of this class and its supposed inheritance and types in the subjective
post- theoretical text is reversed, however this in an anti histro-ontological
sense must also at some point have been or is the case. The move from subject -
object - subjects- is its product, and here the original subject's content is
removed or hidden to a critical or hostile reader. It is therefore not the case
of demanding specifics if this is only in order to remove them - modify etc. we
have placed a special signification in the instant, and one we have said is
problematic, and here formally problematic, one then cannot be describable. Such descriptions are other
objects, real objects, non problematic in form, in logic, in reality, in
metaphysics, maybe, but our initial problematics
form, here in this, can derive a class,
narrative etc.- a generalized class, but
not one capable of producing a critique of it, from some external and
therefore illegality, or open it to illegal alteration etc, or even create it,
as a text. The point here is the abstract nature of our subjects types of
problematic.
The
properties of these subjective classes, methods etc, is that they can have, and
do have multiple different instances with their own life worlds unlike some
universal overarching, and legitimizing, limiting , class or narrative i.e. a
determinist object, typical of modernity.
this
text now opens itself into a space which was already present, and we do not decide on some object, even the
impossibility of an object, this is not considered. The text is distributed, is formed by the
thought, and distributed by the thought, altered by the thought, in this way
and not a formative critique of the thought, it does not formulate the thought,
the thought persists as something undefined by the text, and so the text does
not define even itself.
Now
this de-ontologizes but as yet we have no subject ,
we borrow - an object, in our case 'art', and place it into our subject as the
intention of the thoughts content not its intention. We can say more - that
this resembles a problem, but one without a solution or the desire of a
solution. One again can generalize a metaphysics of sorts from this, of the
sort which changes itself into not just a multiplicity, but a process, a number
of parallel events rather than a singularity.
we
can regard history as being absent, as if it is present its present as
something which prevents history.
The
actuality, of this intention without an object, or objectivity, perhaps is present as it changes, not in a state
change, but rather in the sense of a changing state, one that is never static,
and so never one, a none state, before it becomes useful, the activity of this
intention, not its object its destination, but the word itself must be altered
to reverse its direction to the changing nature it can hold or express, which
it is given, to which it pulls away
from, doesn’t hold but handle, altering and
so is a good word to use here. We say it behaves eventually like an
object, but we must not fail to engage even in the impossibility of the object,
which we are pressured already to leave our original thought, that which made
the art is removed, absented for something other, a thing of truth, and of value. /or other such mythic / idealities-
the whole materialist - determinist
value system is based on this fallacy,
the value of anything including the object itself, it is that there
always has been the alternative to the production of the object of value, the
uncompleted intention, the actuality of the act becoming something else, never
being itself, (a denial of ontologisms ontology- leaving ontology static for a
moment!- though perhaps we shouldn’t - firstly a denial is used as an alternative which has to not
see its other for a moment in order to
generate itself, into a being, which is both a thing and a becoming) which is
to the word an act of freedom and creation, something new, a creation which
continually creates itself, yet never achieves this, leaving the space for its
and anything others, future. (time here can be thought of the present’s movement towards not being
here, without this failure of ontology and
existence nothing would exist)
the art act, this act represents an instantiation of this.
and successfully now - the immediacy not its
instantiated object - there is no object- It is both closed off on its own and
yet produces, is the act of producing the next process, otherwise nothing
including the art - would exist, art's production here is always guaranteed,
but always objectless, still to gain a value, always possible. What is produced is different- only by virtue
of a conceptualizing it as an object, as such it can gain a value, and this is
a description of something other than this, which is then open to
deconstruction, philosophizing, critically evaluation and comodification
etc.
On
method- as historically text
structuralizes thought, the avoidance of thinking in a certain way becomes the avoidance of writing as representation, our problem then is best expressed in writing,
can only be expressed as both being complex, deferred, unstable, and present in
its activity which leaves an unstable mark,
in writings uncertainty and complexity. This is not to engage in the
meaning of writing but the meaning of
thought, the thinking of thought, as an
opened meaning of the prior graphical, objective thought, the problem of
meaning is not the problem of knowing what one means, this knowledge is always
a postori and closes the activity of thought, and so
we use meaning in a way more than its historical sense, keeping its historic sense
but bringing to it the history of consciousness and its presence, of thought
before the event, and not as yet some idea or episteme, and specifically in cases where this involves
the presence of ethical and aesthetic consciousness then this is what I
will call art.
We
then push words - with all they still have and are, into a space on which they
need to work harder than before, we overload them now with our self, in this creative, and not created space which
is always new, we allow them to become creative, this creation must also now be new, as we are, be
new, the word must first uncreate itself to begin to
express itself, and through this our self,
the presence of itself, first disappears, is disappearing, is a presence
, this presence a disappearing of itself, before someone, me, names it, and so
before I name anything, even myself.
(Lets
write towards this, this referent, without violence that wishes to establish a
permanence which prevents this.)
(The
purpose of this is subordinate. Too simple to be pragmatic or symbolic on some
other text, or thing. )
Writing
has always been about something written or something other - not of itself, but
of the referent of this presence. Not a description, words, or a description of
itself, as text. Or what text is. What then is this referent, open, lacking in
violence of presence, giving in to itself and anything other. This referent is
that which denies itself to itself and so is the prime cause. That is in simple
naming and complex metaphysics .
(Language's
presence and permanence is a presence,
as is all objects, including art objects - even when they do not signify a
referent they offer a pretence of objective presence , permanent presence. )
Is a
thought reciting, or has it a dynamic before the confrontation with the idea of
an object, before it can be referred to. And how is it to be referred to, how
is it, its status to be treated, sustained, in the past it was convenient to
replace it with a sign. And this is not
to recourse to emotive gestures, but complex dynamic systems, a language must
be as subtle as this. We have written out simplistic objects and now we are
re-writing writing.
There
are two sources of instability, one logo-philosophical the other
aesthetic-ethic, of consciousness. From the later we do not create or judge
objects but create the spaces for itself, its presence in whatever form, or
not. This space has a structure which
is ontologically missing, absent, not even deferred- or is it in anyway
transcendental. It feels incomplete which may provoke an activity towards it
which is destructive - and contrary to what is provoked. That is its
representation must be in a shifting - a moving- which is possible only now in
a certain linguistic light. Literature is fixed and so cannot move in this
space. Philosophy destroys it - yet there is nothing philosophically
mysterious, imaginary, arbitrary about it, its ethics are our ethics its
aesthetic the same, of what could be called instability, the mutability of
consciousness in the first case, its move towards something in the second, a
move towards a lie, all texts lie.
The
need to be positive imposes new tasks on words. One is certain of this
incompleteness, because of the impossibility of completion, without completing
something else which is then lost to us.
Reading
Nietzsche as a paradigm for reading art as language- or art as text -etc.
Reading
Nietzsche and relying on a reading, what reading is, in the sense of partial
reading or to ask the question how could it be a complete reading, and as to where the
contradiction is, where the error is, there, not if any at all, or in here, by
recourse to itself, not a recourse to Nietzsche’s, then one can ask, who or
what is one reading, and how, and why. How does one deal with such supposed
dual, or multiplicity of readings, and
potential readings. I'm not answering such a question, in any case a dealing
with... is, if not impossible certainly
unlikely, so we are left with writing? Potentially difficult in its sense of
motivation regarding the empty tautological space - spaces? which are provided.
If as we say a contradiction occurs, which is wrong, we invoke a reading of
language which might well reduce to either tautologies or contradictions, how
then is our reading a reading of anything at all. So if we want to read
anything, read in a different way, to a fixing on some contradiction whoever is
writing or reading, but to engaging with
them, which is very much what I at least would wish to do, as for Nietzsche,
the development of his apparent contradictions, though I have tried to point to
these, I would not mind playing a further part in whatever activity might take
place around them, though this is
perhaps a philosophical task, or a task of literary criticism.. for myself however their role is essential in
both destabilizing the text, is part of a
programme of writing before the logical
framework, which is perhaps philosophy, or the end of art, the root of the
idea. Around this disruption, which is yet to have a static object to disrupt,
this is a site which interests me. We arrive disrupted, confused, yet these
words - like all , work backwards from an idea of objectivity- only in some
senses- which is an idea of
language, and logic. Which places us
back with the unspeakable, empty, diseased view of philosophy, metaphysics and
questions of art. Not at ease, this is though the artistic condition as a
disease, unease, which is to be dealt with, hidden, not -solved by the writing, as important, whether it be good or bad, and the same could be said of speech, yet both
are obviously empty- in themselves. They too quickly replace the disease, the
disruption with an empty promise. The text
disrupts the subject with its objectivity at the cost of this subjective space, at the
cost of the subject’s subject ,if this is declined, refused, and silence not entered into, there is something significant here, it
is the opening of the text to thought,
and thought to the text. Opening up of thought to itself, like an embrace. The
embrace that both signifies and is its own subject, we are left with the
feeling which language now embraces before a textual problem a problem opens
itself to the idea of problem, and the idea of problem to the problem itself,
which is present. The referent. Now why is it that the problems idea is hostile
towards its referent, is all language the same. Behind this inscribed hostility
is a person, who wishes to naturally overpower.
Iconographical
metaphysics - here, is a picture of a desired impossibility, it is opaque, which in its desirability, unachangability is a metaphysical 'idea' or picture, the
desire, the lack in metaphysics of the cosmos, a lack for the impossible, the
incompleteness of that which cannot be complete, not of the created impossible
idea, but that being is disrupted not by itself, is itself disruption, desire
of desire in our terms, the aporia of language, a priori, the limit to being and
knowledge which is indefinable, that which
language attempts - is a non-existent ideality, which as the immediate presentation of the
present avoids the nihilism of the
eternal return of the same's non-teleological presence.
If
the a priori of this text is not (significantly or is) its subject , as of all
texts? and the problematics
relating to textuality, the nature of the text but
not the texts subject and the subject has a content that normalized grammars
will not see it, other than perhaps a set of statements which can appear
contradictory, it is both behind and before the writing and not here present in
whatever form we consider, is not here a consideration, here it is a mistake, one of many ,'these are never
articulated, in the subject, but if at all in the event, this event, which follows
the falsification of content and meaning.' Art - or anything other than
language, only if we consider that language stands outside its
description, or otherwise we need to re
cast the text towards its subject at the expense of its guarantees given above,
at the expense of being what it has become. This subject itself being free of
such guarantees, or systems, or yet to establish any, its pre-established state
is not a consequence of its yet to be, or may be, or becoming, or eventuality,
if we consider consequences in a particular way, non historical associations
for instance. Lets try to be positive,
my difficulty of naming is that the
arrival of a name legitimates certain moves, rather perhaps there should be a
list of names, for no other reason other than a psychological economy, at this
instance, which is itself economic , movement, opening, longing, waiting, yet
to begin, even in phenomenology the
subjectivity of a certain presence which
appears before the presence, its
presence, preventing the beginning of phenomenology itself, until the activity
of phenomenology or anything else takes place and objectifies - or attempts to,
de subjectifies at least, fails to ground, yet
provides a ground. The subject is
represented by a state, a feeling which is a presence which was once
established as some movement towards an object, as here it is also. This
writing in itself now becomes a movement towards the subjective subject and not
a description , or critique, deconstruction etc of it. It then becomes of
itself a subject which destabilizes itself, and then moves before this,
stepping outside of its own constraints, if it could step, and here it
attempts, falsely a signification.
But the call to the thing itself is
at the same time directed against historicism, which gets lost in treatises
about the standpoints of philosophy and in the ordering of types of
philosophical world views - as already noted, neither have we committed this
time / structure to be linear, branching, dense or discrete etc. The answer to
the pseudo-metaphysical question is not that we must revise these restrictions
so as to provide for such cases, some poststructuralist semiotics as social
semiotics are concerned with signifying practices in specific social contexts
but we employ modalities in doing the former, of course, in what was called
abstraction, in which we are aware of the difference between the modalities but
we do not isolate them.
Much as we would make much of this
agreement to write as an end in itself, even calling it one of the few
unanimous decisions we took, and given the above analysis of the conclusion
of transcendental deduction, which
demonstrates that all synthesis is subject to the categories, it is puzzling to
find for instance Kant claiming that the unity of formal intuition precedes all
concepts, yet presupposes a synthesis. In the (new) Aesthetic I have treated
this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize
that it precedes all concepts, although it indeed presupposes a synthesis which
does not belong to the senses, but through which all concepts first become
possible. We have little interest in
modern metaphysics which regards itself with respect to the new absolutes of foundationialism
and tries by means of this, its own grounding, to integrate the other sciences
, philosphies etc. as a pre-ontological knowledge
according to its own standards of truth; or the opposite case, the modern philosophies, theories etc which
makes of themselves absolute foundations
and, if need be, appropriates elements of metaphysics according to its own
methodology by this process the whole as such, surveying its entire content,
itself emerges out of this wealth wherein its process of reflection seemed to
be lost.
In the light of such conclusions,
our question is not fundamentally about
the certainty of knowledge, signs, symbols, speech and writing on the basis of
the, states, affections and what holds for consciousness, that holds here for
so called subjective existence in general. On the contrary, we understand ideas
primarily in the act of using them; reflective, theoretical awareness of them
as distinct, extant things which develop from these, after all, would be quite possible in view of the difficulty
of effecting a transition from metaphysics to another kind of thinking. It is
often very difficult to be able to decide what predicates are to be taken as
primitives and which are to be defined via suitable nominal definitions outside
of metaphysics yet inside art, nothing like what is called the explanation of
the manner in which a priori concepts which can relate to objects.
Connections with intuitionistic’s
were noticed early on and toposes are still used to
investigate models of various aspects of intuitionis,
instead of the inner activity and self, movement of its own actual intention,
such a simple determination of direct intuition, Anschauung which means here sense, knowledge is predicated in accordance with a
superficial analogy, and this external and empty application of the formula is
a false construction. There has been a strong though by no means unanimous
trend in development of such
conceptualism, when new techniques for understanding art were supposedly being
developed and that understanding itself was being transformed! (sic) Kant
described what this in effect was as the relationship between the critique of
reason and the science of metaphysics which has to be grounded anew by means of
the concept of transcendental philosophy, I would not wish to use the title transcendental
with relation to knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects, Kant did
not demand that one completely do without these instruments in philosophical
knowledge, but that one should become aware of their specific difference of
performance in the respective knowledge of the object itself - and this would
prove useful in particular, it will be useful to see whether this sort of theisis or objection towards a theoretical positioning is involved
in anything which would follow from the truth the universality of any logical
set of events as practiced by the phenomenologist qua artist - non
conceptually, from the very beginning the universality in which he or she
becomes the totality of his/her practice? - processes bring about objects not only as a thematic of the individual processes of intentionalities and thereby discloses its noematic components; it further directs itself on the intentions
of the activity, which lies in both the history and programme of conceptual art
towards this relative presence. Similarly, because of this external and
historical - instituitional hostility towards such
structures we have here now something under such a risk - even towards the empirical research and deductive -
analytic logics of post -modernity in
general.
The fundamental meaning of exactness
in all of this lies in its being founded on an a priori formal system where each
part unfolded in a specific act which can through praxis produce theory similar
to general theories elsewhere - we see talk of theories of ethics etc.
theories of pure concept, theory of idea, etc for a
hermeneutics described as a condition, at the outset as the unbreachable
basis for its method, that can avoid problems - an alienation between the
physical and the natural as an instance.. (Looking at the arguments in the
foregoing paragraphs what legitimates the value judgements if they relate to
old teleological requirements or tendencies - such primitives in logic which
rested on the idea that if any two sentences mean the same, then they are about
the same things- and this is in effect challenged.) In contrast to these sets
codes we may be forced by some considerations to adopting non codes -
structurally simpler objects which critically are pushed to the point of being
empty - empty of symbolic meaning but not of some empirical concept - which
then can generate a basic for semotics etc. , originally
- like in history not employing standard conventions and formulas , so they can
generate cliches and stereotypes brought to stand in
being called to cast itself as self in one of its possibilities of existing and
committing itself to a draft of itself .
The empirical does not allow for the
evaluation of normative claims especially if its own is a separate point from
the critique of the general importance of certainty and control in The New Art,
thus, even though Derrida can say that diffrance is
the condition of possibility for presence, he will not permit this term to be
recuperated and thence become the site of origin itself - this has an obvious
importance to us here. Now how do things stand in relation to this
subjectivity? Modern theories of self, organization phenomena have several
roots which did look for control hierarchies, but we quickly see more complex behavior that opposed the reductionism of the modern,
universal as metaphysics, distinguishing itself from the traditional principles
first fundamentally in regard to this methodology- if it should so be called.
It recognizes its self, a reflective function
of its self, examination for the
relative realization of the correlative practical idea of sense, whose
structural forms of being and whose practical norms it is to investigate, it
recognizes its self, reflective function for the relative realization of the
correlative practical idea of a second sense, whose structural forms of being
and whose practical norms it is to investigate, namely as one consciously and
purposively directed towards this absolute idea.
From premises of that kind it is or
might be concluded that real thought in fact took other forms and was governed
by other laws than those that this current logic considered the sole
determinations of intention. For example, on one reading of the following
sentences.
1:Theory is a victim especially of
this misunderstanding because, apart from refusing to shift from the
metaphysics of subjectivity to a consideration of being as being, it adamantly insists on a
fundamental drafting of being as egoistic, ie as an
egoistic subject, into which it then introduces the imperative, absolute ethics
of the other.
2: Everything that was discussible
has been discussed; this is true is no longer
in order to express the occurrence of
events, but we use events to express
that events occurs over time.
M
We have described the position
regarding logics before the epoche in the
phenomenological event as being absent and non foundational, and the dangerous
consequences of theory, the old syntactic and semantic rules etc., the use of
which is so fatal to subjects which could be described as being empty ,i.e. the
history of art and language. With the - so called - but not- empty subjective
space the free play can and does allow in certain circumstances - i.e. performative acts etc. - the 'whatever it means to you is
what it means' approach, typically cited in
post-modernity, which occurs for what may be a number of reasons,
which however is not a singular approach if we regard the ethics which are in very simple terms
present in the very act of intentionality, seeing, destabilization, instability,
phenomenological presence, as presence
of a wish or desire ,want, need, etc.
We are then in being honest open to
judgment, and in turn offering judgment which communicates prior to meaning and
theory etc, prior to symbolic evaluation,
which is a significant externality, as well as an internality and such
judgments being ethically based are free of tautology, are flexible, unstable
themselves, which is here a good, not a
bad thing. We can now see how fixed rules, old syntactic and semantic rules,
etc, simply wont do in regards to the world.
The alternative pragmatic free play - anywhere- but especially
throughout all of what is called post modernity is essentially hedonistic, the
'whatever it means to you is what it means' of post-modernity, is hedonistic.
In placing ethics before this, it forces a limit on the pragmatic and opens a
space in the hedonistic pragmatic field in which once again perhaps we can
communicate, that is recognize the difference, the instabilities, between
others but primarily first in establishing ourselves, as subjective, dynamic
entities, and so remember and so avoid the downside of the 'whatever it means
to you is what it means', a kind of
eventual chaos from which one is unable to escape, to the extent that even the
subject becomes lost. There can be no art here even as absence, (want, need,
etc which elsewhere is called instability) for what may or may not be possible,
as even when non realization is concrete the wish, desire etc, is effectively
dealt with by the propositions of pragmatism.
The morality of intention, position,
description, state, desire, wish etc,
without which it wouldn’t be is yet
another parallel thread.
i should note - though
personally there is no need- that the status of "can", is sufficient, a possibility is sufficient,
as even its provisional state attributes itself, this problem then doesn’t
arise, the pragmatic response if it chooses, is to ignore this, to completely
remove it, and so effectively remove everything, and this is why Post-modernity is
amoral, it seeks stability and attempts
to fix itself, even in its free play. This ethics arises from this, lack of
permanent presence, intention, position, description, state, desire,
instability, wish etc. ,it is
there, as an ethics, a morality, but one
which is self aware.
Does this then impose itself on us. i don’t think it does - for then it would destroy this, its
own instability .This morality is from
outside. The best name.. A society - is this? .. It is irrelevant to ...the
actuality of each day, each deconstruction, lack of permanent presence, etc.
Any text tries to stabilize this instability and so it is not ethical, as is
any text which opens itself to free play etc.
Meaning, answers, questions, provide solutions and these are not
moral activities. You can not do
anything with this given instability. It destabilizes itself yet fails to
remove itself - replaces itself with something else which is itself unstable,
incapable of Becoming form, as each form materializes it remains, as an
instability.
The problem of art is not simple,
simplistic notions just wont do. The phenomenological activity, the epoche, is internal and in all cases is yet to open itself
to logic, or philosophical problemizing, it is then a
complex problem. It is a problem of intention. To intend to problematize
is the causality of modernity, within our work now there is no causality, there
is non i think generally in phenomenology anyway. The
intention and the problem coexist, in a manner which is not causual,
non teleological. The coexistence
outside of causality avoids the conclusion of an object. Such complex parallism avoids the lack of dimensionalities of logic. But
this is getting prescriptive or descriptive of the very unfixed problematic
state. We do not need to use words in new ways. We need to avoid prescriptive
logics and clever tricks. External ideas. we are still in the wrong mental set,
still looking
but what we can do is a decisive step
away from even intention and problem, otherwise we are bound to these by some
causal logic, some ethics of empiricism, of phenomenologisism.
And here we can as it were we use
language differently.
intentionality is the
product of a primitive instability. It follows
that all texts are provisionally unstable. what is it then which singles this out.
Firstly its reluctance to take this on, secondly its own intention as an
intention. This looks like tautology, but it isn’t in that it distances itself
from itself and differentiates itself from itself.
The moment of recognition of the
problematic of distancing in intention is a phenomenological event before the
decisive act, which in this case apriori will not
become decisive, the decision is this recognition of what becomes, what always
is unrecognizable what is not accurately casually describable.
I can see a potential criticism in a
lack of difference, and such a problematic might be considered as a new
subject, a good thing , a new source of discussion, however its really a kind
of metaphysical criticism, and we are operating beneath this, before it. And so
the first answer, a metaphysical answer, is that we are not doing metaphysics, though there
might Be an analogous opportunity in metaphysics. There are I think however
other answers which do not depend
on any metaphysical critique.
I suppose a logical one is simply
that we will only find identity in an ideality,
and we are seeing the
destabilization of our intention as not
a consequence of our intentionality towards an ideality
but as a deliberate act, of a phenomenological epoche
which subjectively is always different.
The refusal to give in to
logical difference, or not, is a refusal
to engage with the metaphysics of logic or the logic of logic.
There are others, from elsewhere we
know that the play of difference de
stabilizes a status quo, the signified , the
signifier is the play of difference.
That
identicalities are, is an aporia,
The identity of indecernables
maybe like wise and the contradictions of the eternal return etc. Our difference however lies in the relation
of our problematic towards itself, firstly recognizing it as described as an
internal destabilizing source and so deliberately before this logical - empirical
destabilization takes place, intending a prior
destabilization as a phenomenological intention, and this has to Be different. even before logic
establishes its difference, or the phenomenological realization does as we
intended it in the first place, destabilization is always present, always different. If it were not then we have an ideality, which is firstly impossible, but more importantly
not wanted, not present, as its presence would remove the problematic. That is the old mistake.
The space in which this specific
language describes its subject is uncertain, as is the ability for any
descriptive process to take place. This was termed our problem, and by others
seen as a final act of some reductionist step. The
examination or re-examination of such texts is another activity in its
self. A text may have to have a subject
- a pre text - and yet in itself can develop other subjects, this is where we
might differentiate ourselves from some deconstructionist program of making
something new. Our pre textual intention is art as not a reductive questioning,
which borrows much from analytical philosophy, but as a destabilizing process,
recognizing itself and it simultaneous
subject. the goal here is not an
ontological destabilization, and not the destabilizing of something, anything
else. Its fairly obvious why this should
be so, the move towards abstraction is as good an example as any where
Destabilizing the ontology may well be seen as the problematic. Or in
conceptualism... But as soon as we realize the problematic the artwork is
realized and completed. Yet a repetition or copy of this work is no longer
considered art is perhaps the result of
the removal of the problematic and not the primacy of a solution. The primacy
of solution paradigm was effectively removed by the failure or success of
conceptualism which in effect nullified the idea of art. It became an ideality. Anyway
without the problematics of art there would be no
art. This very thing is after all what
we want, what the whole thing is about. The insight is sufficient to see how
then it is possible to continue. Historically but not presently Each time we find a problem it is a case or
possible site for how we deal with its actuality. Modernism mistakenly
attempted an analysis , a kind of enlightenment ethic, one in which
understanding mapped the limits of the cosmos, we could do art, the evidence of
this is still in the museums. A conceptual critique of this only refined art
into the problem of art to be dealt with. Not other problems for Intentional
activities do not occupy physical spaces and problems within them are not
concepts or theory. We do not have to prove our questioning here, or is it an
empty question, remember we had an intention, a motive for doing this. This problem may well be an indication of the
scale, an infinite scale, of the difference between the ideality
and the intention. I am not concerned with the ontology of the ideality, or any special supposition which we can place in
the most pessimistic of places, but with the danger of some self satisfied
description. This simply will not do, is disrupted by all kinds of
externalities, but the artistic move here is our intention to disrupt it
ourselves. Or better at the same time finding this.. Ontology, of any kind, has
absolutely nothing to do with art from our point of view, as an artist. The phenomenology of the question -not why we question - is the artistic act. The question has a content not based around
this ideality of art and our attitude towards it, it
is there already fully developed. Our attitude towards it is not as an ideality, we simply cant compare, it's another’s problem,
with no stable epistemological framework, no doubt as serious a problem as ours
is. The framework itself appears as a
transcendental question. And this is wrong from an art practice point of view,
it must be reversed, we are again
attempting to say something about art as ideality,
yet what is actually happening is
something to do with our intentionality, it's the cause of our problem, its
obvious that it is, we feel it so. There
could be all kinds of reasons for these problems, as exposed by analysis,
philosophy etc. and there might in principle be a way of dealing with them,
from outside, or we could simply
pragmatically ignore them, but here is our move as artist, we want a
particular problem to be a phenomenological instance, we intended this to be
so. Any acceptance stops our activity.
There is no need to underline this act as a kind of objective framing.
All previous ideas of transcendence, overcoming, re-stating, refining, making,
etc are not questioned, but the intentionality is so framed as to open itself
to itself , and not some other problem. That is our aim is not an arbitrary
questioning or revision, our aim moves no further than itself as question. This
is a very particular kind of question empty of any content except itself, and
that is why it cant be answered and that is why is can be validated if it needs
to be. Each time the moment of this question is realized we have another site
for an art work. It is never though some intention at ideality,
it has been realized in post-reductionism terms that it is itself which is the
only possibility.
Intentionalities may be regarded as some
objective ideality, but I would not like to do so here. There is no value in
this, what I want is not a foundation building exercise, this quickly looks
like tautology if it keeps to some set of consistent rules. This new space is
uncertain, the process disruptive. And neither do we want imaginary objects, if
everything is provisional then its that which we need to destabilize. It
appears I am doing something I cant do, not just setting up things to be
knocked down or are we making
progressive systems.
Language is once again at the service
of experience, and not supplying any donotic insight
or bags of rules. The mistaken confusion was elaborated so that the method
became the arbiter, the confusion was and is real, the problematic also, and
the interplay between the various significant systems something quite other,
the problematic is both pre and post linguistics, things like meaning and use.
The awareness of the problematic was never intended first as being useful, it
is after all a morphological feature in the past. How meaning, words, work here
is radicalized and not random. Syntactically if allowed to run its course
language eventually empties itself. But
these problematic of meaning exposed the remaining phenomenology of the real,
and what well call the intentional subjective problematic of art, once the
structures of meaning in language are removed. That is this is not a question
but the presence of absence, elsewhere described as instability, absence of ideality, recognition of the possible presence of an ideality yet still intending it. The criteria for
impossibility and contradiction being removed not by the failure of language
but by the continuation of our wish to hold on to this unresolved, unresolveable.... A
captured image of a movement which removes itself in its movement.
We have moved beyond process of destabilization
as casual intentionality into actual destabilization as an apriori.
So we have removed the worry of what to do, the difficulty of what to do,
causality is planning and planning gives
rise to causality, and causality gives rise to objects, whether material or not
as signifiers of something which cannot be signified, in a field of truth
mapped by untruths.
Language as meaning is only one
object among others, and meaning is a finality. An excuse. The reuse of it in evidencing these unstable phenomenologisims
could be described as representing a new abstraction of representationalism. It is then seen philosophically, where
old philosophy looked for meaning and stability, as negative phenomenology, a
negative philosophy though not anti-philosophical.
The philosophical here is used as
another analogy of what we are doing. We talk about the problems of philosophy
, the problems of art, as something to be solved, something to be dealt with,
yet the word arises after the fact and logic after the word...
This is not to dismiss logic or
language as a pragmatic structure. No matter how well it accounts something
remains which is not a wish, romantic, mystical presence, but can be described as a problematic presence towards which our intentionality can not causally be placed. They remain layered together outside of a,
the, sentence with absent ideality etc etc, in no
conceptual chain. The problematic destabilizing itself, its ontology, its
epistemology, etc etc. . After all surely it must do
that.
Intentionality and the exposure of is
problematic could be described as a descriptive attempt which does not engage
in art activity, but this is a naive approach, if the activity was to set
itself as the area for the problem to
exist in it would play a role.
However when we focus on this problem
we see it is not a problem at all in any ordinary sense. Or is it a casual process. Now I am not engaging in a kind of metaphysics about this
non objective non subjective intended, having dismissed the ideality
as an impossible intention, it is no longer the impossibility of the intention
towards an ideality which is a cause of failure. Only
historically. An historical naivety which is beside the point, we cant really
say anything like this, as its about this that
we do not concern ourselves without concerning ourselves with ontology. Or are we drawing up lists, we are
engaging in the actual activity of an intention towards art. Other things of
course appear, we are not naive purists, or boring tautologists.
Or can we abstract some kind of formulae- such as ……... Its not a question of
epistemology. There is neither a multiplicity or a singularity. This not a pre chaotic state of undifferentiates
which appears post analytically, but the result of an intentional act towards a
ideality. Not (a subjectification
of the object or attempt at objectivity, the ideal remains an impossibility,
the subjective remains as a totality. But there is no point to this. We have
chaos- subjectivity, pragmatics, wishful thinking, and the impossible idealality. We regard the ideality
as a site of failure of both subject, and
object. However we are not bothered with (this) failure.
The event around idealities
and language, of pragmatics and their limits regarding idealities
has first pragmatically removed idealities from
consideration by some, but by others placed them in an unreachable location,
and importantly opened up the ground between the absolute of the ideality and the pragmatics of the subject. This has to be
a generalized ground at its limits- at the ideal, but between such convergent idealities we have an intentional space which can have
titles such as art philosophy science ,
mathematics etc. The intentionality
moves us from the pragmatics of a null subjectivity into this field. There is
no reason for this to be a negative field but we need to be aware of the nature
of this fields instability, it is essentially unstable, neither a subjective
pragmatic, which can be fixed, a decision, or an actual impossible ideality. The metaphysics of this instability is
interesting but surely it is undecideable as to their
causalities.
What we have are the intentional spaces which we have
described above, spaces which are essentially unlimited.
It now requires us to see how such
essentialities can themselves be destabilized, are destabilizing. This is
relatively simple, an simple intentionality will do.
Elsewhere texts have attempted a critical and positive step from a multiplicity of possibilities- which are
not considered as objects, writing, communications, internalities, and these texts have exposed these themes. To
re-examine these would be like going backwards to synthesize an object out of
its fragments. But already we have fallen victim to objectivity. What we have
discovered as essential is a critical
subjectivity of destabilization.
Superficially it might be
difficult to see anything wrong with this , however in not doing so we might be seen to be replacing
its move, one of destabilization with another objectivity, or attempted
objectivity, or illusion of an objectivity. We might once again find ourselves
in a determinist descriptive world trying to do things such as figure out what
art is.
the powerful lessons learnt, the
significant discoveries of the absence of the art object was a reductionism and
objective fact. Its the nature of this fact which can despite its apparent
negativity ensure the very thing we want. A destabilizing activity, a
subjectivity attaching itself to subjectivity in order to objectify
itself. The condition of pseudo theories
such as other texts, is such that they can appear to objectify themselves in order to be effective and so their very
success is a failure. Inhibiting other
texts, and being essentially now a dead object. Such writing as other art
before, essentially closes down everything. And we can dream up any number of
sentences of the kind which point things out , even negatively. Self
destabilization might be thought to be an ideal, but only in the sense that idealities are simply not allowed. A trite recourse to
failed idealities misplaces or replaces the dynamics
of non textual, non prescriptive discussion, activities etc. That something is
said actualizes a destabilizing feature is only a logical and not artistic process.
That offering meaning or abdicating it is also I think wrong. To ask What are
your intentions is the response to this,
intetionalization cuts things off, stops them
straight away, what things of course, neither. Both. Not neither but not in
some middle ground, there has to be a radical use of language here which avoids
certain placements, maybe all placements.
To cite something else is a grounding
and therefore a bad move, a halting move. What’s wrong then is this, this very
agreement.
We should not cite the... as pun on site. There is no site. Neither is
there a non-site. Such sentences are
difficult and potentially dangerous. We
need something not closed off, open , dynamic, non coding in a fixed
way. The very play of codability non codabilty is not our business, it is just that we find this
is a potential problem in misunderstanding the kind of structure we have, and
how the word structure is being used.
perhaps It is the non objectivity
of the texts focus and not the texts non objectivity, disability, which is
important. Any textual disability is besides the point. The real de-stability
here - is here already, and wanted , but here already.. There are numerous
things of uncertainty here. Intention, reality, subject, aporia
of action. We break open the question, we don’t question it in some hall of
mirrors fashion, or remove it. We have
radicalized the geography of the sentence and its causal chains, as they are
responsible for placing stability as a universal. and we are then in this new place. Such a
position has no relation to an object, is neither outside or inside the object, the object
becomes not unbounded but its boundaries are no longer binding.
It is the essential activity which only appears contradictory if we
regard words such as ‘problem’ as meaning something quite specific, i.e. Not
problematic. This fault is to be sorted out elsewhere, but here it does not name but generates the problem as itself. The record of this, the reading of this
is not a de coding , problem to
solution, which implies a set possibilities of success, yet the success of this
here now has been assured in its own intention , and its own uncertainty is the
guarantee and proof. We move on to
uncertainty and intention.
From a causal point of view and
ignoring (I can I think borrow a term here - under erasure) both matter, and media* , we can move on to
examine the play of logic and meaning,
and here we can question meaning as it relates to art, or, and art practice , we should return
to this and or.... what occurs …… here
at this point is a splitting, as opposed
to a synthesis, (a very non dialectical move, an alternative dialectical move
subsumes everything into the absolute...There art and every specificity
disappears ) and at such a split the opportunity to move in two directions
occurs, we have choice rather than a synthesis, yet perhaps only one of these
can now validate the artist and
art. .. Only one of these non synthetic
choices is now - has now become - or is becoming - the artistic move. A
separating out of a particular intention.
(Later and elsewhere the meaning of meaning is itself split,
deconstructed, etc.) What is left on the other side of our question of the
meaning of art from the question of meaning
could be called a place for art activity to take place. Is always the
place it takes place. A conditional hiving off is a disruptive destabilizing
activity in which where the one side relates to a move towards art is
questionably art, the other to other objects etc. We pursue , now historically, the process through ontology
towards a negativity, but this too can be destabilized, fragmented, questioned.
And again a split occurs and a choice has to be made. This now appears like an
endless and logical causal chain, it is perhaps the play of logic into
meaninglessness, an exposure of meanings
inability to mean anything- even nothing- a metaphysics of nothing, and or a
metaphysical failure, it is always attempting to capture what is outside,
and a decisive choice here has to be
based on our initial and continued intention- and it this in causal terms which
is what accounts for its non-philosophical move, away from problems of being -
Metaphysics etc
A move which was not a move but an
exposure of what was already present, and the intentionality which remains in
this presence. I would call this a non pragmatic move as it does not any longer
have any ideas about solutions.
In this non pragmatic move into a space
outside of pure subjectivity? Or not -
in the senses or arbitrariness,
pure objectivity or intentional objectivity, we do not become involved in philosophy, even
a radical philosophy - a philosophy which perhaps can also occupy such a space, or become involved with trivial
objects. Dead cows for instance. I make these points here to avoid any confusion
as to what we are doing or better intending,; intention is here may well be
crucial.
Where we are now is beyond the word
itself as something stable, and beyond
the instabilities which Modernity either failed to deal with, or discovered,
such as how things and substances differentiate themselves, that there is here a particular thing before
its name could be particularized. How this coalesced how it can be de-
coalesced, and through ideas of instability
in communication taking place,
how these are questioned etc. Therefore the position of the word the text, the
before or after the word as something definite, we do not single out, or use
this as a critique or a methodology or better an intentionality that we already
had, this itself, is now not as it was,
an imaging, a means of producing a set
of propositions.
Numerous structures now disappear, which can
be, have and are being critically
considered, this as opposed to a negation, a negative reductionist
move, there dissapperance leaves a presence. (Without
meaning, meaningless too disappears, nihilism is the product, a result of
logic.)
The ideas that are essentially
against this negative, reductionist move need
not be followed, we can consider these structuralist,
outside art with their own problematics. If we consider all reductionist
moves might arrive at dead ends, they destabilize reading and logic, and this
removes them, does not put them under
erasure, regarding art activity, the move in art which apparently arrived
at a dead end, is removed. This is one
removal, from outside. The second more radical removal is internal and simply rejects reductionisms
conclusion, after allowing it, on the empirical evidence, there is something
still present. Even if it were not we could intend it. what was exposed in reductionism was a
displacement of idealities, now the location of these
may be regarded as a dead end
if one regards the absolute ideality as a
possible reality, or as achievable, but now its removal or arrival has not
removed our intention or ability to do so. Its removal, or arrival has made it
possible to defend ourselves from being called unreasonable, or meaningless, as
in it total presence there is something else, or a possible intention, and in
its absence there is a presence or possible intention.
And so we have a very limited pretext in which to work, because of the
removal of certain spaces, structures, logics et al. Spaces
between perfect - (and non realizable) idealities,
and complete but pragmatic subjectivities.
Any number of destabilizing texts may appear, and appear possible
and we can admire these, appreciate
these but we are now as it were underneath them. They are destabilized by our
intention - which we now see which is neither pragmatically fixed or ideally
fixed. The very failure of
modernity which produced such an
instability such un certainty gave us a methodology - and importantly showed an
alternative, perhaps in its own
confusion gave us the opportunity to see that the problematic of art remained,
and we wanted it to remain, we actually liked and like it.
As for the pragmatics of stabilization, justification within
post-modernism, these old forms are ok, they have in the face of the
destabilization chose to ignore what was empirically exposed, which I
think in effect has been to ignore art
as an intentional activity.
It may be a legitimate move to not
become involved in other activities - but certainly if we avoid the problematics regarding art, we avoid art altogether.
*This ignoring is a token for a
complex activity of analysis perhaps best regarded from other disciplines. The
term is not pejorative either externally or internally. But importantly we are
not ignoring our particular intentionality.
Any text sets out to say something in
a certain denotative way must be suspect with regards to art activity.
We do not want to talk about the problematics of text, or texts, here. Art has
consistently refused to engage in the problematics of any given text, theme or subject. In
particular it seems to locate only to draw attention to what it is not, only to
displace these objects, text or not. From an art point of view the textual structures like any other structures are of
no concern in themselves, in their histories, this is even at the extreme of ignoring the truth, or
radically not having any serious regard for
the technicalities of any science, semiotics etc, such as even the
status of the signifier and the signified. Their relationships, status, histories
etc. This is why I have said elsewhere we have in comparison a radicalization
of the use of language. However the text here, is not through its formalities in error regarding art, its error must be
elsewhere, actually in its stability. This does not mean that the textual move
was a mistake, those who have called such a move a blind alley were I think
mistaken. It was the only possible route
away from the physical object art object paradigm. The so called failure in textuality was in a way to be expected the same kind of
thing happened elsewhere when chasing such absolutes. So also To engage in
semantic meaning, or nonsense, or poetics is mistaken even if it is not a blind
alley, as is analysis of any kind whatever, psychological, philosophical,
metaphysical etc.
Formally the texts records - badly -
but its the best we can do - the art practice, its properties then are
irrelevant, relevant is, or better was,
the ability to pose in text a question. Distinguishing itself as text
was irrelevant to art, so text is mere
pragmatics, and that is why it becomes radicalized. What can be said as a
detailed questioning, critical,
responsive process etc cannot be
achieved in other media, where we see the - you see what you want attitude
regarding gallery objects, the
gallery situation was only ever a very primitive formal
presentation of completed stable objects. The objects here are closed,
anthropomorphically dead, and speechless. But another possibility is that of
speech, the relationship of text to speech need not concern us - in the face of
other media the questions that are raised are phonetic, whether speech or
writing, it is the structural purpose as use which was important and still is,
that is significant in pushing the problematic of art further, we could look at
the question, the thought, But not to- again- question its process but to show
its failure. to phrase this positively, this becomes what art is, as seen,
experienced.
the radicalization of this language is the result of the radicalization
of the art activity,
How is it that idealities
became a problem is resolved in their
position as problems. Art - as art may
function as some semiotic / philosophic or pseudo-philosophic tool,
whatever art as art means, outside yet
defending this tendency and such an activity might be
socially very useful, but so might be our radicalization. we are after
all trying. Whatever, I am not heading towards some wonderful derridaian autonomy, even if , and I doubt it, it happens.
Ones own psychological position is difficult; which is symptomatic but in no
way conclusive. Whatever. Is it like this or like that, whatever, it is
specific. And here is something someone might say is an original and positive
statement. Although specification is kind of boundary drawing. We must move on.
we must avoid solutions, why? Why cant
these equally become radicalized. This after all could be called a
solution. this activity - which is art -
is fundamentally illuminating in the nature of things. It might from outside
validate its morphology.
So if we are not satisfied with this,
how psychologically fatal this would be.
"doubt can exist only where a question exists" Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus
Firstly and historically, 'art' is the
instability of its own definition, the instability of its signifier and the
instability of its signified. Secondly art in late modernism - in
conceptualism, is the instability of the
ideas around its ontology.. Whether this reflects a cultural, philosophical ,
biological , or even cosmological - metaphysical - fact, is besides the point
from an art point of view. The artist engages in the instability, is its actor.
The mistake, and part of the de-stabilization , is looking for final
definitions. And of course now here is such a mistake. But allusions to
philosophy -biology - history - art history - culture - parody - humor - politics are
even more besides the point. we do not define either negatively or
positively, but create the instability, or rather point it out in the now
present, now present text. This text's status as art is (then) essentially
unstable?
Critically we are caught between logical certainties and
methodologies - we note Nietzsche - heidegger and derrida's challenges, questioning of truth, logocentricism et al. - or something nonsensical, even
poetic.
That there is a general
epistemological instability is interesting,(outside or above and so inclusive
of art), if art was to be descriptive it would certainly define this general -
philosophical- metaphysical instability - elsewhere called deconstruction. I
might even criticize the term if I was not principally interested here in art, and not here! interested in
philosophy, ontology etc.. The
prima-facie case I will go on to make isn't the historical instability but the
inherent instability here now, and the nature of this, its proper naming, or
inability to do so. The status of this
work as art does not lie in its willingness to be uncertain, unstable, any
critical position is in itself challengeable, I could imbed such a challenge
here, but that it attempts to indicate that the problematic remains no matter
what. Why this defacto or de jour cannot be realized
is obvious- though maybe it should be re stated, its restatement can again be challenged.
Remember Russell's remarks regarding the
tractatus - it throws up an uncertainty as to truth.
Yet here we don’t even have any given criteria
as to the significance of truth, or whatever. We are left with the art
and its ontology having a greater
uncertainty, instability - if you like than philosophy, in Russell's sense, but
perhaps not elsewhere. However its only psychologically reassuring to find
oneself in company, there is no internal assurance as to right or wrong. Both
absolute positions and any other are questionable. And so on and so on.
Perhaps at this point we need to say
more about materials, however such a discussion would be a kind of
anthropological investigation, texts as signs are simple in pragmatic terms.
Specifically its the conceptual instability and not the physical instability
which makes us artists and not physicists, galleries and objects represent
places for the physics of instability to be demonstrated. And restoration does not restore art back to the
object. so I would consider the method of writing firstly as pragmatic, though
there are difficulties with this, in how we write, with regard to meaning as
expressed in language as being casual or logical, problems with the idea of
equivalents etc.
The legitimating of the art practice
has to be in the first place with the artist,
how do you know you are doing art unless you are questioning the
activity , other wise you are probably
doing something quite different and allowing some external definition-
and so some external person as artist.
modern day impressionist painters are
painters, modern day conceptualists are conceptualists
so we need to reject the idea of
concept as art, but still accept the
discussion. The Judd dictum about anyone calling anything art is an excellent
example. It relates to a specific historical destabilizing, and the product of
a new- and Judd’s- position, which is a new definition, or art object. Its
truth or not is not as important as the ability to take up views about it. That
is destabilize its objectivity. In a way he doesn’t know what he is talking
about.
The recognition here is that we cant get
answers which are in anyway fixed. Consumerism maybe demands a pragmatic art,
and that has been typical of post-modernism but in our definition it isn’t art
at all, as its taken the pragmatic step of making a decision, it enters the
gallery- or re-enters- and so there is nothing more to be said , nothing more
to see, nothing more to do, the artistic move here was - if any - the moment of
curatorial decision, however in reality the curatorial position has already
presupposed art and its objects. One
does not re-discover America these days. One might discover something of it,
but any object based curatorial or artist- move is now about objects, and I
include concepts, politics, feminism, et al. And others. In other words not
art. As artists brought in by questioning other things, so they are excluded -
or else everything is included. the
point of the pragmatic inclusive decision is we then have to either discuss it
or not. The objects then are if we do, clearly not the same, we then maybe wish
to back down from this position, but again so long as we are doing the thinking
its us that is realizing the art. The object once this process is over returns
to it original and pre-artistic state. Just as in aestheticism, once no longer
beautiful the object returns to its original state. Once the Beautiful is
separated from art by a questioning process, a raising of doubt in modernity of
the qualification of a objects properties as art we move to other
considerations. However even when the aesthetic was concerned as being an
attribute its nature was also unstable. The de-stabilizing of the material
object-art paradigm was the achievement
of conceptualism.
This was only one in a series of
destabilizations, of representation, of subject, of content etc which was
modernity.
Conceptualists first engaged with the
concept as object. Objectivity
followed to a collapse in the ability to
find a stable conceptual object at all. All this is history, and as such
Belongs in a museum. The move was not made in which Not the concept as object but concept as
process before the object was arrived at. Such a destination is of course outside
of art, which explains why it was avoided.
But the alternative seemed to put an
end to any activity at all, other than subjective and empty gesture. However if
the radical move was made and the subjectivity of post modernity’s rush to make
objects, again, is avoided we are not, as it was thought left with nothing,
left with nothing to do. In removing the historical edifice of modernity we
actually do expose something. At the very minimum a space for intentionality,
which is not the excuse for objects.
The destabilizing process at this point
does not collapse into nothing, for the same reason as the removal of a
philosophical system does not remove its cause, there was a cause and before
this cause gained its causality a presence, and in the absence of a presence
the space for an intention. The failure
of a logical system due to internal inconsistencies does not necessarily remove
the reasons , the intentions for its use, and these need not be some other
inconsistency. Logical, metaphysical, biological, cosmological etc. Its
possible still to want to do something and until we say what it is we cant say
its a mistake.
'Generalizations
-in art and philosophy' where we can
refer to 'this'. and not a specific- and this is maybe sufficient, so sufficient then that specific disciplines, activities
and subjects must too be generalized. Intentionally - is a modified
metaphysics, a modified process or even a modified theology, we are in effect
dealing with de-polymorphic activities, pre conceptual attitudes
etc. - before specifics- is an interesting
area in which to be. /sic/
Missing
- this- as in a consideration of non presence and the need to now show that we
can avoid missing premises is a possible tactic of both this activity and its
simultaneous writing. These become specifics in themselves, and not dialectical
subjects / objects/ we are not interested in dialectics.
'That
nothing makes a difference.' - we do not need to consider the so called objects
of communication in art which fail to
make a difference to the psychological being of the phenomenological presence
of what has been called the iconography of art - before its logos - and neither
the appearances, images, texts grammars etc. - after the epoche
- which is after this moment, - we would say prior to perception- are
differences seen- these objects fail to difference consciousness- the
phenomenology of being - present in the subjective subject which- this - we
call here art, - rather the logical structures have been seen both in
short terms and in its histories to change - and so articulate - signify - in
this subjective revealing of their fictions as objects of the conscious
field, of developing an ontology, in
which case we see ontologies as pseudo-ontologies as subjects of private iconographies - which
appear never to change.
We
can as what others have called the / what we would like to call deep/
phenomenological epoche before sign and signifier -
before ontology and metaphysics, history etc, this landscape of the particular before its actual
description - before it particularizes itself - or is made into an event - as it in it's self consciousness is always
identical - with itself- always different to anything else- even when it is an
historical event - of remembering, could be considered as a iconographic act,
it is - here called art - but elsewhere philosophy etc. and we might consider
such an answer to be that its presence is not iconographically
opaque - but resides as a universal potential.
This is not
a drawn description, it is not a history, not a raw phenomenon , and
that then goes for any signification, beyond the subjects subject - as art
which could be described not in morphological terms - reusing the language of
morphology etc, but in a new language which could be thought of as art as i.e.
non signified private language activity- or not - but something far wider - far
more complex.
'or
should we consider art as a private language '
Essentially
there is only one listener.
Who
is it that listens and why, it might be said we listen to familiarize the self
- lets compare this to game playing, entertainment or education, having 'pet'
theories, and detailed knowledge of given facts. If we wish to explore truth,
and thought, and why should we, what would be wrong in not doing so, - we need
not to direct thought and consciousness at its own instability but use this as
a method of experience of the general….,
in any private language, a private language as language without a
reader, the excuse for such thinking would validate itself now, which it does
so, must do, the compromise occurs only in simple social communications - which
legitimate the power of the word, sign, over the signified individual.
Given
a reader what we then explore are the limits of communication at its most
abstract, any audience revolves around the prospects of fascism, and these problematics - socio-economic -cultural. etc.
Removing
these - we still are faced with the continuing problem - that is what as I can
I do, and what difference this makes, what difference anything makes in some
teleology.
Which is a solution to the working out of the
problematic, far from being a sterile phenomenon it is productive, unlike the
socio-artistic-conceptualist -etc which inevitably after failing logically -
implicit or explicitly- abandons meaning for elegance.
The
movement has been to amalgamate the synthetic in avoidance of the logical
object to subjective narration, avoiding
the hierarchies of questioning which supposed an answer, but a narration
of the many problematics - which is both art and the life-world
- cosmos,
avoiding
metaphysics and such nonsense, which then is not complete but a mark,
signification etc. but narration is only an excuse here at signifying the
proto-world before objects, which is hidden by the sediments of language, logic
and meaning, and against a belief in such devices with their teleological
implications.
Where
we might have said….A brief note to begin.. where or when such things developed
is an historical interest- morphology, overloading- or hiding of the object, in
theory - the synthetic productions of extreme parallelism et al. are historical events within some
structure - both- all- generated out of a particular instantiation- and not of
a class, or culture, as a productive,
pragmatic , capitalist move- the devolvement
of hierarchies - networks of various and varying topologies, being
actively open to historicizing or being regarded as ontologically present in
the past or present or not...-etc. There is yet to be information- this is
defined from instances in the form of
generalizations, which produces symbols, signs,
language, formality and images,
tautologies logics, aesthetic screens
and finally in this process, this list, epistemologies etc. which is an attempt
at a formal generalization- of a 'metaphysical' instance. Such a description in
itself could be constructed by reference to an instance- in fact all such
generalizations need to be made specific with regard to their genesis, and seen
therefore less than they actually appear,
language needs to degeneralize itself and
rediscover its subject. Otherwise it becomes a legal instrument for the
prevention of genesis. - life - experience- process creativity etc.
"Why
a text of a particular subject would need to be seen as being empty is in order
not to have a reflexive permanent content or even one which is or can be
regarded in the light of future textual analysis. "
within
this, our practice the text will always be open to its particular subject and
in order to do so will need to empty itself, or maybe at least to a hostile
reader appear to do so! - to be an abstract
class for the subjects world
space, it cannot then be either public,
or static, which would remove, or allow removal, modification etc. of
its particular instantiation , and so allow further reuse, reevaluation,
interpretation , analysis and deconstruction- of its content - world space, and
not just its abstract methods (there are non), as seen here. That the class, this class, container is deconstructable doesn’t effect the subject which is now
separated to what might appear logically to have generated it, though in our
case this reversed, logically or gramatologicaly,
though not in the non history - pre history of the subjective phenomenon, the
source of the text becomes a instantiation
which is hidden to the empty generative class and others which it creates, which even generates itself, and as such can
take part in a history of analysis etc. as well as safely instantiating its subject, to the extent that
the subject is allowed to be itself, regarding itself as an instantiation of
its own life world not determined by external logics, grammar, rules bases etc.
For instance in relation to its class which it generates and which is so a
generative class itself, of itself and others.
The
nature of this class and its supposed inheritance and types in the subjective
post- theoretical text is reversed, however this in an anti histro-ontological
sense must also at some point have been or is the case. The move from subject -
object - subjects- is its product, and here the original subject's content is
removed or hidden to a critical or hostile reader. It is therefore not the case
of demanding specifics if this is only in order to remove them - modify etc. we
have placed a special signification in the instant, and one we have said is
problematic, and here formally problematic, one then cannot be describable. Such descriptions are other
objects, real objects, non problematic in form, in logic, in reality, in
metaphysics, maybe, but our initial problematics
form, here in this, can derive a class,
narrative etc.- a generalized class, but
not one capable of producing a critique of it, from some external and
therefore illegality, or open it to illegal alteration etc, or even create it,
as a text. The point here is the abstract nature of our subjects types of
problematic.
The
properties of these subjective classes, methods etc, is that they can have, and
do have multiple different instances with their own life worlds unlike some
universal overarching, and legitimizing, limiting , class or narrative i.e. a
determinist object, typical of modernity.
this
text now opens itself into a space which was already present, and we do not decide on some object, even the
impossibility of an object, this is not considered. The text is distributed, is formed by the
thought, and distributed by the thought, altered by the thought, in this way
and not a formative critique of the thought, it does not formulate the thought,
the thought persists as something undefined by the text, and so the text does
not define even itself.
Now
this de-ontologizes but as yet we have no subject ,
we borrow - an object, in our case 'art', and place it into our subject as the
intention of the thoughts content not its intention. We can say more - that
this resembles a problem, but one without a solution or the desire of a
solution. One again can generalize a metaphysics of sorts from this, of the
sort which changes itself into not just a multiplicity, but a process, a number
of parallel events rather than a singularity.
we
can regard history as being absent, as if it is present its present as
something which prevents history.
The
actuality, of this intention without an object, or objectivity, perhaps is present as it changes, not in a state
change, but rather in the sense of a changing state, one that is never static,
and so never one, a none state, before it becomes useful, the activity of this
intention, not its object its destination, but the word itself must be altered
to reverse its direction to the changing nature it can hold or express, which
it is given, to which it pulls away
from, doesn’t hold but handle, altering and
so is a good word to use here. We say it behaves eventually like an
object, but we must not fail to engage even in the impossibility of the object,
which we are pressured already to leave our original thought, that which made
the art is removed, absented for something other, a thing of truth, and of value. /or other such mythic / idealities-
the whole materialist - determinist
value system is based on this fallacy,
the value of anything including the object itself, it is that there
always has been the alternative to the production of the object of value, the
uncompleted intention, the actuality of the act becoming something else, never
being itself, (a denial of ontologisms ontology- leaving ontology static for a
moment!- though perhaps we shouldn’t - firstly a denial is used as an alternative which has to not
see its other for a moment in order to
generate itself, into a being, which is both a thing and a becoming) which is
to the word an act of freedom and creation, something new, a creation which
continually creates itself, yet never achieves this, leaving the space for its
and anything others, future. (time here can be thought of the present’s movement towards not being
here, without this failure of ontology and
existence nothing would exist)
the art act, this act represents an instantiation of this.
and successfully now - the immediacy not its
instantiated object - there is no object- It is both closed off on its own and
yet produces, is the act of producing the next process, otherwise nothing
including the art - would exist, art's production here is always guaranteed,
but always objectless, still to gain a value, always possible. What is produced is different- only by virtue
of a conceptualizing it as an object, as such it can gain a value, and this is
a description of something other than this, which is then open to
deconstruction, philosophizing, critically evaluation and comodification
etc.
On
method- as historically text
structuralizes thought, the avoidance of thinking in a certain way becomes the avoidance of writing as representation, our problem then is best expressed in writing,
can only be expressed as both being complex, deferred, unstable, and present in
its activity which leaves an unstable mark,
in writings uncertainty and complexity. This is not to engage in the
meaning of writing but the meaning of
thought, the thinking of thought, as an
opened meaning of the prior graphical, objective thought, the problem of
meaning is not the problem of knowing what one means, this knowledge is always
a postori and closes the activity of thought, and so
we use meaning in a way more than its historical sense, keeping its historic sense
but bringing to it the history of consciousness and its presence, of thought
before the event, and not as yet some idea or episteme, and specifically in cases where this involves
the presence of ethical and aesthetic consciousness then this is what I
will call art.
We
then push words - with all they still have and are, into a space on which they
need to work harder than before, we overload them now with our self, in this creative, and not created space which
is always new, we allow them to become creative, this creation must also now be new, as we are, be
new, the word must first uncreate itself to begin to
express itself, and through this our self,
the presence of itself, first disappears, is disappearing, is a presence
, this presence a disappearing of itself, before someone, me, names it, and so
before I name anything, even myself.
(Lets
write towards this, this referent, without violence that wishes to establish a
permanence which prevents this.)
(The
purpose of this is subordinate. Too simple to be pragmatic or symbolic on some
other text, or thing. )
Writing
has always been about something written or something other - not of itself, but
of the referent of this presence. Not a description, words, or a description of
itself, as text. Or what text is. What then is this referent, open, lacking in
violence of presence, giving in to itself and anything other. This referent is
that which denies itself to itself and so is the prime cause. That is in simple
naming and complex metaphysics .
(Language's
presence and permanence is a presence,
as is all objects, including art objects - even when they do not signify a
referent they offer a pretence of objective presence , permanent presence. )
Is a
thought reciting, or has it a dynamic before the confrontation with the idea of
an object, before it can be referred to. And how is it to be referred to, how
is it, its status to be treated, sustained, in the past it was convenient to
replace it with a sign. And this is not
to recourse to emotive gestures, but complex dynamic systems, a language must
be as subtle as this. We have written out simplistic objects and now we are
re-writing writing.
There
are two sources of instability, one logo-philosophical the other
aesthetic-ethic, of consciousness. From the later we do not create or judge
objects but create the spaces for itself, its presence in whatever form, or
not. This space has a structure which
is ontologically missing, absent, not even deferred- or is it in anyway
transcendental. It feels incomplete which may provoke an activity towards it
which is destructive - and contrary to what is provoked. That is its
representation must be in a shifting - a moving- which is possible only now in
a certain linguistic light. Literature is fixed and so cannot move in this
space. Philosophy destroys it - yet there is nothing philosophically
mysterious, imaginary, arbitrary about it, its ethics are our ethics its
aesthetic the same, of what could be called instability, the mutability of
consciousness in the first case, its move towards something in the second, a
move towards a lie, all texts lie.
The
need to be positive imposes new tasks on words. One is certain of this
incompleteness, because of the impossibility of completion, without completing
something else which is then lost to us.
Reading
Nietzsche as a paradigm for reading art as language- or art as text -etc.
Reading
Nietzsche and relying on a reading, what reading is, in the sense of partial
reading or to ask the question how could it be a complete reading, and as to where the
contradiction is, where the error is, there, not if any at all, or in here, by
recourse to itself, not a recourse to Nietzsche’s, then one can ask, who or
what is one reading, and how, and why. How does one deal with such supposed
dual, or multiplicity of readings, and
potential readings. I'm not answering such a question, in any case a dealing
with... is, if not impossible certainly
unlikely, so we are left with writing? Potentially difficult in its sense of
motivation regarding the empty tautological space - spaces? which are provided.
If as we say a contradiction occurs, which is wrong, we invoke a reading of
language which might well reduce to either tautologies or contradictions, how
then is our reading a reading of anything at all. So if we want to read
anything, read in a different way, to a fixing on some contradiction whoever is
writing or reading, but to engaging with
them, which is very much what I at least would wish to do, as for Nietzsche,
the development of his apparent contradictions, though I have tried to point to
these, I would not mind playing a further part in whatever activity might take
place around them, though this is
perhaps a philosophical task, or a task of literary criticism.. for myself however their role is essential in
both destabilizing the text, is part of a
programme of writing before the logical
framework, which is perhaps philosophy, or the end of art, the root of the
idea. Around this disruption, which is yet to have a static object to disrupt,
this is a site which interests me. We arrive disrupted, confused, yet these
words - like all , work backwards from an idea of objectivity- only in some
senses- which is an idea of
language, and logic. Which places us
back with the unspeakable, empty, diseased view of philosophy, metaphysics and
questions of art. Not at ease, this is though the artistic condition as a
disease, unease, which is to be dealt with, hidden, not -solved by the writing, as important, whether it be good or bad, and the same could be said of speech, yet both
are obviously empty- in themselves. They too quickly replace the disease, the
disruption with an empty promise. The text
disrupts the subject with its objectivity at the cost of this subjective space, at the
cost of the subject’s subject ,if this is declined, refused, and silence not entered into, there is something significant here, it
is the opening of the text to thought,
and thought to the text. Opening up of thought to itself, like an embrace. The
embrace that both signifies and is its own subject, we are left with the
feeling which language now embraces before a textual problem a problem opens
itself to the idea of problem, and the idea of problem to the problem itself,
which is present. The referent. Now why is it that the problems idea is hostile
towards its referent, is all language the same. Behind this inscribed hostility
is a person, who wishes to naturally overpower.
Iconographical
metaphysics - here, is a picture of a desired impossibility, it is opaque, which in its desirability, unachangability is a metaphysical 'idea' or picture, the
desire, the lack in metaphysics of the cosmos, a lack for the impossible, the
incompleteness of that which cannot be complete, not of the created impossible
idea, but that being is disrupted not by itself, is itself disruption, desire
of desire in our terms, the aporia of language, a priori, the limit to being and
knowledge which is indefinable, that which
language attempts - is a non-existent ideality, which as the immediate presentation of the
present avoids the nihilism of the
eternal return of the same's non-teleological presence.
If
the a priori of this text is not (significantly or is) its subject , as of all
texts? and the problematics
relating to textuality, the nature of the text but
not the texts subject and the subject has a content that normalized grammars
will not see it, other than perhaps a set of statements which can appear
contradictory, it is both behind and before the writing and not here present in
whatever form we consider, is not here a consideration, here it is a mistake, one of many ,'these are never
articulated, in the subject, but if at all in the event, this event, which follows
the falsification of content and meaning.' Art - or anything other than
language, only if we consider that language stands outside its
description, or otherwise we need to re
cast the text towards its subject at the expense of its guarantees given above,
at the expense of being what it has become. This subject itself being free of
such guarantees, or systems, or yet to establish any, its pre-established state
is not a consequence of its yet to be, or may be, or becoming, or eventuality,
if we consider consequences in a particular way, non historical associations
for instance. Lets try to be positive,
my difficulty of naming is that the
arrival of a name legitimates certain moves, rather perhaps there should be a
list of names, for no other reason other than a psychological economy, at this
instance, which is itself economic , movement, opening, longing, waiting, yet
to begin, even in phenomenology the
subjectivity of a certain presence which
appears before the presence, its
presence, preventing the beginning of phenomenology itself, until the activity
of phenomenology or anything else takes place and objectifies - or attempts to,
de subjectifies at least, fails to ground, yet
provides a ground. The subject is
represented by a state, a feeling which is a presence which was once
established as some movement towards an object, as here it is also. This
writing in itself now becomes a movement towards the subjective subject and not
a description , or critique, deconstruction etc of it. It then becomes of
itself a subject which destabilizes itself, and then moves before this,
stepping outside of its own constraints, if it could step, and here it
attempts, falsely a signification.
But the call to the thing itself is
at the same time directed against historicism, which gets lost in treatises
about the standpoints of philosophy and in the ordering of types of
philosophical world views - as already noted, neither have we committed this
time / structure to be linear, branching, dense or discrete etc. The answer to
the pseudo-metaphysical question is not that we must revise these restrictions
so as to provide for such cases, some poststructuralist semiotics as social
semiotics are concerned with signifying practices in specific social contexts
but we employ modalities in doing the former, of course, in what was called
abstraction, in which we are aware of the difference between the modalities but
we do not isolate them.
Much as we would make much of this
agreement to write as an end in itself, even calling it one of the few
unanimous decisions we took, and given the above analysis of the conclusion
of transcendental deduction, which
demonstrates that all synthesis is subject to the categories, it is puzzling to
find for instance Kant claiming that the unity of formal intuition precedes all
concepts, yet presupposes a synthesis. In the (new) Aesthetic I have treated
this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize
that it precedes all concepts, although it indeed presupposes a synthesis which
does not belong to the senses, but through which all concepts first become
possible. We have little interest in
modern metaphysics which regards itself with respect to the new absolutes of foundationialism
and tries by means of this, its own grounding, to integrate the other sciences
, philosphies etc. as a pre-ontological knowledge
according to its own standards of truth; or the opposite case, the modern philosophies, theories etc which
makes of themselves absolute foundations
and, if need be, appropriates elements of metaphysics according to its own
methodology by this process the whole as such, surveying its entire content,
itself emerges out of this wealth wherein its process of reflection seemed to
be lost.
In the light of such conclusions,
our question is not fundamentally about
the certainty of knowledge, signs, symbols, speech and writing on the basis of
the, states, affections and what holds for consciousness, that holds here for
so called subjective existence in general. On the contrary, we understand ideas
primarily in the act of using them; reflective, theoretical awareness of them
as distinct, extant things which develop from these, after all, would be quite possible in view of the difficulty
of effecting a transition from metaphysics to another kind of thinking. It is
often very difficult to be able to decide what predicates are to be taken as
primitives and which are to be defined via suitable nominal definitions outside
of metaphysics yet inside art, nothing like what is called the explanation of
the manner in which a priori concepts which can relate to objects.
Connections with intuitionistic’s
were noticed early on and toposes are still used to
investigate models of various aspects of intuitionis,
instead of the inner activity and self, movement of its own actual intention,
such a simple determination of direct intuition, Anschauung which means here sense, knowledge is predicated in accordance with a
superficial analogy, and this external and empty application of the formula is
a false construction. There has been a strong though by no means unanimous
trend in development of such
conceptualism, when new techniques for understanding art were supposedly being
developed and that understanding itself was being transformed! (sic) Kant
described what this in effect was as the relationship between the critique of
reason and the science of metaphysics which has to be grounded anew by means of
the concept of transcendental philosophy, I would not wish to use the title transcendental
with relation to knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects, Kant did
not demand that one completely do without these instruments in philosophical
knowledge, but that one should become aware of their specific difference of
performance in the respective knowledge of the object itself - and this would
prove useful in particular, it will be useful to see whether this sort of theisis or objection towards a theoretical positioning is involved
in anything which would follow from the truth the universality of any logical
set of events as practiced by the phenomenologist qua artist - non
conceptually, from the very beginning the universality in which he or she
becomes the totality of his/her practice? - processes bring about objects not only as a thematic of the individual processes of intentionalities and thereby discloses its noematic components; it further directs itself on the intentions
of the activity, which lies in both the history and programme of conceptual art
towards this relative presence. Similarly, because of this external and
historical - instituitional hostility towards such
structures we have here now something under such a risk - even towards the empirical research and deductive -
analytic logics of post -modernity in
general.
The fundamental meaning of exactness
in all of this lies in its being founded on an a priori formal system where each
part unfolded in a specific act which can through praxis produce theory similar
to general theories elsewhere - we see talk of theories of ethics etc.
theories of pure concept, theory of idea, etc for a
hermeneutics described as a condition, at the outset as the unbreachable
basis for its method, that can avoid problems - an alienation between the
physical and the natural as an instance.. (Looking at the arguments in the
foregoing paragraphs what legitimates the value judgements if they relate to
old teleological requirements or tendencies - such primitives in logic which
rested on the idea that if any two sentences mean the same, then they are about
the same things- and this is in effect challenged.) In contrast to these sets
codes we may be forced by some considerations to adopting non codes -
structurally simpler objects which critically are pushed to the point of being
empty - empty of symbolic meaning but not of some empirical concept - which
then can generate a basic for semotics etc. , originally
- like in history not employing standard conventions and formulas , so they can
generate cliches and stereotypes brought to stand in
being called to cast itself as self in one of its possibilities of existing and
committing itself to a draft of itself .
The empirical does not allow for the
evaluation of normative claims especially if its own is a separate point from
the critique of the general importance of certainty and control in The New Art,
thus, even though Derrida can say that diffrance is
the condition of possibility for presence, he will not permit this term to be
recuperated and thence become the site of origin itself - this has an obvious
importance to us here. Now how do things stand in relation to this
subjectivity? Modern theories of self, organization phenomena have several
roots which did look for control hierarchies, but we quickly see more complex behavior that opposed the reductionism of the modern,
universal as metaphysics, distinguishing itself from the traditional principles
first fundamentally in regard to this methodology- if it should so be called.
It recognizes its self, a reflective function
of its self, examination for the
relative realization of the correlative practical idea of sense, whose
structural forms of being and whose practical norms it is to investigate, it
recognizes its self, reflective function for the relative realization of the
correlative practical idea of a second sense, whose structural forms of being
and whose practical norms it is to investigate, namely as one consciously and
purposively directed towards this absolute idea.
From premises of that kind it is or
might be concluded that real thought in fact took other forms and was governed
by other laws than those that this current logic considered the sole
determinations of intention. For example, on one reading of the following
sentences.
1:Theory is a victim especially of
this misunderstanding because, apart from refusing to shift from the
metaphysics of subjectivity to a consideration of being as being, it adamantly insists on a
fundamental drafting of being as egoistic, ie as an
egoistic subject, into which it then introduces the imperative, absolute ethics
of the other.
2: Everything that was discussible
has been discussed; this is true is no longer
in order to express the occurrence of
events, but we use events to express
that events occurs over time.
But this- either - is not enough, and
such a definition/s is merely nominal, which do you like most, which enjoys a
clear syntax and a precise semantics compared to some existing representative
reified temporal systems such as those of the following analysis which would
have to thoroughly investigate as claims to have disentangled logic from
ontology, an investigation I’m unequipped to carry out at this point. All
imaginative synthesis is not subject to theory- or theory of theories, and this
presumably includes whatever synthetic components are inherent in mere thought
- or what we could call anticipation- regarding internal categories, we are
growing increasingly aware that the top layer is a context which is extremely
difficult to handle, roughly speaking a model of a theory may be defined and
used as a possible realization in which all valid sentences of the theory are
satisfied and a possible realization of the theory is an entity of the
appropriate set theoretical structure etc. but now we find that this in our
case simply wont do. The definiteness and anaphoricness
of it in induces a sort of familiarity effect in which some absence in a thing
that permits it to be supplemented, has the course to a replaced refinement, an
improvement, the warding off anomalies, with praxis, the strong possibility of
confusion outside, contradiction as perceived internally, living with the
difficulties of the attempts to stucture such events
could be regarded as a very speculative
psychological activity - whereas it is not yet in such a category - as it is
what it is to mean, as for grammar for instance or the formal elements, it refers us to the
articulation of categories, and therefore to the understanding, which will be
no doubt treated of only later in nuerous levels and categories, and perhaps most likely in
ignoring the reasons for a belief being rejected -when any of the following conditions
are met - we could regard this as some kind of non conclusive success. This means
that the ideas in theories gain some propetries -
only afterwards - and so a postori generate the physical
thing, in itself - and then ideas such that in Kant that it was beyond knowledge, unknowable- in itself.
To think abstractly then meant to be
enslaved by the force of current catchphrases and clichs,
of one, sided, empty definitions, of instituitions
and sicial constructs meant to see in real,
sensuously intuited things only an insignificant part of their real content,
only such determinations of them as were already jelled in others consciousness
and functioned there as ready made stereotypes, these paradigms of art theory
supported the intent to examine art as the context of art- and in effect became
an attempt - at a final closure on theory..
A great deal of work has been done to
study how the probabilistic inferences, much of which is initiated in
conceptual art itself, i.e. as for something not philosophy even strictly
speaking, and that is not a science
though which in cerain latter stages attempted to
borrow from the philosophy of science a valid methodology- to illustrate the issues of defining this
ontology, to consider the praxis that serves mostly as a pretext for shutting
down the theoretical critique that transformative praxis would require in the
latter eventualities. If one does not understand this initial transformation of
the concepts of a text, then we necessarily come back to the question of how
subjects actually select attributes of the activity to apply to these texts in
their extension and evaluation - we
will, I think, beg no questions if we simply assume that an adequate conceptual
framework must employ some system of the sort indicated above to such
temporally qualified and singular statements, for example, it is expressed early in art and language that there was a
kind of extension and so borrowing of a synthetic framework as as ideology, moreover, the deflationary theories of falsity
that needed then to be considered - motivated in large part by classical logic
- produced more problems than the objects they were brought in to clarify, or
in many cases exclude. What we know, or what we would know if it were simply a
question here of something to know, is that there has never been, never will
be, a unique definition, object, paradigm etc. of course, of the kind of
critical reflection and tolerance for conflict in an important start to
uncovering the ways that we act and think that ignores our dependence on
genuine communication - if it took place. This ignoring is a token for a
complex activity of analysis perhaps best regarded from other disciplines. We
have moved along the lines of the synthetic but in post-modernity we have a
larger scope.
The synthetic movement in Kantian
terms provides some basis for a legitimacy in the creative activity not asd some objective historicy but
as some kind of unity in the Transcendental Aesthetic and that this was
attributed to sensibility, although in fact it presupposes a synthesis which
does not belong to the phenomenal senses
and that as synthetic constructs it creates an ontological question regarding
an analysis of its accounts which require
in the analyses of it’s possibility that certain propositions exist,
notably, singular propositions and, in particular, propositions that dont
exist in fact but would exist if certain individuals did, as would be the case
through a clarification of the ambiguity of meaning in the nature of a
synthetic movement or moment - before hand - which has historically been called
the phenomenologically of pure conscious
subjectivity, we can understand on the deepest of grounds the historical
invincibility of psychologism - yet see how such
complex situations are factual as a non sigular act
of syntheisis in
experience. Some historians who feel, however, that there is a heuristic
reason for presenting these ideas as well, to the abstract concrete distinction
of specific function found it easier to start from scratch and write new
formalities- favoured texts which drew attention to their constructedness
and to the processes involved in their construction and this pragamatically appears at first sight something of a better
descriptive move. For such an architectonic reading it would doubtless be best
to consult here these matters of the
semantics of my text, and analysis of the need for a third synthesis, again
following Kant closely we cannot recognize a recurring representation as the
same representation unless we have a synthesis for seeing the representation as
the same, inventing existential graphs and introducing rules of inference that
depend only on the operations of copying, erasing, and combining - this gets
conceived of as a relation of extant representations to extant things, to the
extent that our cognitive being uses this framework correctly and accurately,
it takes the place of the present. This
time, a reading of the connotations of the text would confirm the reading of
its descriptions; I have just indicated the principle of this reading, and
should point out that this is obviously another move away from the synthetic
activity with which we begin. In the absence of such an account, the
philosophical significance of the contrast remains uncertain and an annotation
never has a reference in both the concept of philosophical experience that both
challenges Kants distinction and rejects Hegels constructions in the course of their investigations
must proceed beyond physical facts and mathematical methods; such theorization
is one of the basis of scientific explanation, once scientific skepticism is focused on it, Platonism is hard to maintain
- but that is not again now our problem, its here to demonstrate the pragmatic
effectiveness of such forms as dialectic closure, of such sets of answers. So
creativity is seen to offer not only a validation for activity but for a
methodology of activity itself - the result of such a search or seaches for new
theories and hypotheses in the presence
of the production of events, moves which appear whenever a candidate for an
anomalous example comes up has to the mainstream been to choose representations
which were already familiar and now through constant reuse over some thirty
years have come to feel natural and unmediated, and can even shape what we
accept as reality at least within a genre, provisionally, however, one might
define such an activity as a metaphysical activity as that form of thinking which fails to investigate
the intelligible structures or principles which underlie the activity and its
objects and which determine its activity as now being far too naïve yet still increadably adaept at production.
Heidegger for instance must have recognized this deficiency, since the works
that immediately follow Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics deal with freedom
with increasing directness and a kind of social critique was generated as a
side effect of such a philosophical activity. The intuition is that such
production of hypotheses is systematically unconfirmable
and undisconfirmable, of course instituitions
have always been very robust and able as
a process provide images telelogy and logic as a
technological solution to bridging the gap between the ogjcetives
of social activity and the synthetic event including the use of these actual
terms and texts in the form of metaphor, including metaphors of space have
mediated an imaginary constitution of society, indeed, the two dogmas, the belief
in the intelligibility of the analytic, synthetic distinction and the belief
that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of
confirmation or infirmation at all, the very version
what it is about that escapes understanding is objectively preserved not only
because of the criteria that a paradigm must satisfy in the very early stages
such as preserving problem, solving the solving anomalies that devolped from the dialectical problems of such activities
to lead to the solution as the
objectivity of criteria that remain.
There was in all this a particular
emphasis on a recent break with
argumentative antipsychologism intraditional transcendental philosophy, but nowhere were
the objections deeply and firmly enough based, nor did those who explored the
evidence see conceptually that the transcendental must evidently go back to
conscious experience and on this ground
through actual descriptive, analytic and eidetic work, a radical clarification
of all its special forms found in early exploritative
texts.
(On Burn, Ian: The Role of Language
1991.)
Like all the other categories, also
the process of writing - of moves in conceptual art - its typical structures failed to locate an
ontology, the writing, therefore, in order to be what it is, must be able to
function in the absence of both general metaphysics and ontologies
in particular and every empirically determined structure in general.
Consider, for instance, a non, modal
quantifier claim and we are thereby led to explicate the relation of one to the
other in order not to secure the place of metaphysics, we must enquire as to
how this surpassing to the supersensuous could be
accomplished, only the occurrence or
revelation of the text to be examined, its social semioticians
that acknowledge that not all realities are equal, and are interested in texts
as sites of struggle in which realities are contested- can speculation on
perception be reformulated as a theory of intentionality that can yet reveal
itself- and become something like an object itself. Heidegger’s analyses this
synthesis in the mode of apprehension as having a double character, take this position
and all feelings for this one, and then take all concepts and their objects
and also all thought for the creation of
such texts for example, and the set here is a text is defined as the set of
problems where the instances can not be directly
checked - from the forms and
possibilities of these texts - and their intentions which before being
objectified cannot be enumerated it becomes clear that what is meant in this description
is not only a conception of the context of
things but at the same time an interpretation of the sense and purpose
of the text that we attempt to create. Coming at this all from another angle,
how is one to decide whether a particular feature is necessary or contingent,
since we have constantly failed to find only one, and so we cannot fall back on
the simplest way to test a claim to necessity, i.e. that it occurs as an idea that can be neither metaphysics nor
science.
Some of the paradigms of abstractness
are non spatiotemporal in a straightforward sense, if one is not a substantivalist about space and or time, one can describe
the abstraction as invoking the idea of ever thinner layers of the bounded
entity….. thus the category differs from the notion, in that the notion gets
its unity from mere logical reflection, while categories have as their content
a synthetic unity. Though elsewhere - in Heidegger - the ontological erasure in
metaphysics remains, and a hope for naturalistic accounts of knowledge,
language, consciousness, intellect, etc. in determining intention as presence, presence of the present event - present
in the form before the object, or self-presence of the present being in
the form of self-consciousness, metaphysics could only consider the sign as a
passage, a place of passage, between two moments of presence, the provisional
reference from one presence to the other, and so is not really very suitable
here.
The ‘true to the Western tradition
idea’ that controls not only in theory, but in practice in the principle of its
practice the relationships between objects and writing, theory and praxis….
does not recognise in the latter more than a narrow and derivative
function- such complex parallism avoids the lack of dimensionalities of logic and
all of these dimensions are determined in accordance with the horizon and
require a disclosure of the horizon and of the levels and dimensions of sense
that are not made clear through this disclosure, for interactions of the
lexical and conceptual systems in every natural language has a well organized
lexical and syntactic system- here Kant is quite explicit that he found his
categories of the understanding by an examination of his own judgments, they
were what he saw to be entailed in the logical forms of judgment - and it is
not in passing that we go back to this point of judgement. In practice there is
no limit to the historical ideas of existence, possibilities of access and
modes of interpretation of histories are themselves diverse, varying in
different historical circumstances. Similar remarks apply to theory, except
that they expresses themselves as a kind of
universal quantifier, for example, we may say that, in knowledge, the
intentional component is belief, by which knowledge itself is a case of
intentionality.- as we are accustomed to say, we are able to think something
about it - and as previously indicated, these are in the causal event and point of application of
the effectual event different points, the spanning of which is through some
action at a distance- non local action when transformed from event causation
into an equivalent agent causation becomes a physico-social
action- which maybe is defacto the case but need not neccesaryily be what is wanted in the first place here, this
idea is repeated elsewhere- since if texts themselves are considered to rest on
second order codes the first order codes being those in which language
consists, this book could offer the rough draft of a third order code, destined
to insure the reciprocal possibility of third order texts- this questioning
thinks the question of the texts- of their presence and production a question that is essentially misleading and
in its manifold meanings is still not mastered! but what remains unthought in the matter of philosophy as well as in this,
is method, others are more concerned with correctly presenting ideas than
subjecting them to doubt, look at this in the light of the way most art ‘shows’
are ‘presented’.
The type token distinction in
relation to signs is important in semiotic terms to much of the above- not as
an absolute property of the sign vehicle but only insofar as it matters on any
given occasion for particular purposes to those involved in using the sign so
the recent interest in anaphora is largely an interest in finding a semantic
theory for problematic anaphora- but our inquiry concerning theses intentions
conflict with the main problems within positivisms overly exclusive attention
to empirical observation and logical validity and conceptions immediately
brought about constructive shifts in the whole system of logic.
We may formulate our concern, then,
as follows, is there anything in the claim to mention this distinction leads us
to discuss certain established ideas that usually come to notice in this
connection - the first problem raises the question what exactly is involved in
interpreting which refers to the abstract system of rules and conventions of a
signifying system, is it independent of, and pre-exists as individual and subjective
objects for their self determination,
knowledge which enables us to understand in our ordinary comprehension something
of them which is essentially false, /their objectivities/ we attend to this
activity only as one of many - as a particular event amongst others and so no
attention to this activity - or rather an oversion to
this and its character - or more generally a complete indefifference
is found but here no longer is attention required - this being as such, that is, to its
character as being- is sufficent.. If this formulation is adopted, then it is
clear that the thesis is not one of physicalism and it
may well be viewed as a broad version of the thesis of logical behaviorism, and if this is taken as granted, then logical behaviorism entails this formulation of the thesis of physicalism. Note that I focus not just on knowledge,
transfer, etc. which I think focuses on
the intention but on a type of knowledge, including now outside this semiotic
model - of art- of Universals- indeed
the apparent effect of our discussion of justification is to at once raise anew
and seriously aggravate the classical ideas of theory or, perhaps better, one amongst the classical
problems as a whole as theoretical pluralism ought to be not only the stance of
the position of an adequate textuality given a lot of
possibilities to build opposites, logic, grammar, semantics, word games,
phonetics, writing, gestures etc and since all knowledge is essentially
intuition, and all thought might ultimately relate to intuition, this ground
must itself be an intuition.
If we use the test for technical
terms suggested by discussion, then we run into obstacles in trying even to
establish the connection, a programme etc even though at a semantic level,
however, there are profound differences in meaning and intention general logic
only deals with the function of thought as unification, without regard for
relation to objects, intentions etc. and for instance - to answer a specific
criticism- theories are regularly rejected, if a paradigm must somehow supply
such criteria, then this is clearly an extension of meaning. Coherence
theorists might answer this question by saying that what is believed, is believed is true - this
must here, is, however, the problem with the concept of the theory in itself,
which lies in its presupposition that there is some infinite intuition that
knows things as they are in themselves, for if we do not accept the
presupposition of an absolute intuition that first produces the thing, that is,
the presupposition of that concept of theory, in the sense of the produced
text, that did not develope out of ontology, then we
also cannot accept the concept of the theory in itself here- this reading of
the category of whole, however fundamental, it cannot be generalized to any
other ontological types of whole- but what it shows itself of itself in the
openness of the truth of this text and I notice also that this distinction is
only of pragmatic or mnemonic value; the formal definition for the sense to ask
of any such object, anyway without the problematics
of art there would be no art.
One reaction is, of course, simply to
regard this as evidence that any identification of the requisite sort is
hopeless, the language maybe defined
just like the language of the predicate calculus with identity, with additional
clauses in the definition of a formula: whatever is a formula, so is - or the
point of this whole thing, a
demonstration of a set of problems: it shows, but doesnt
necessarily say - and this distinction is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one
by which the theme of ontology and thus of philosophy itself is first of all
attained and the scope of the reader who could so trivialize some of the
problems in the previous paragraph.
Kants treatment of the
relationship of the pure imagination to apperception, and of both to the
understanding, contains the same ambiguity as to the primordiality
as we find in this so we see an apparently natural use made of those methodical
aids, definitions, axioms and proofs, which in Kants
opinion are primary and permissible only
in mathematics- but which can be extended into any tautological structures- and
this of course raises foundational themes in art and language- though we are no
longer either caught or that concerned in such tautologies as foundations. .
This is a problem for most critical
theorists: in linking powerful interests with particular institutions or
customs they rarely explicate ethical criteria or guidelines on which the
critiques are based, in conformity with this usage, all non philosophical
activities have as their theme as some of these sentences show which show how
to make context, dependent references, a rigorous definition, which would have
to be gained in another way, nevertheless, the idea involved remains,
reappearing in the form of the recurring theme that abstraction is
falsification, and in this form is central to this logic and this metaphysics -
if they were supposed, but the matter as such which they are to present is the
same, although it is experienced in different ways, giving reasons for actions
is explaining themselves and this is a form of causal explanation, this
complexity, which at times is presented as a simple homology of attributes,
would mean that there are always more than interpretive questions at stake.
This presence - intention - text - becomes not a given metaphysical premise,
but precisely the object of explanation itself.
Any criticism which serves to illustrate a broad form of
essentialist argument, common to much essentialist work, which might
justifiably be attributed to the present is not identical with itself, for
example Heidegger’s claim is that by giving shape to our historical
understanding of what is metaphysics
determines the most basic presuppositions of what anything is, including then
this - however for another instance in our ordinary language but also in
philosophical texts the terms are never of equal value - we might express this
by saying that someone who endorses the correspondence intuition so understood
would endorse these propositions- now the problem with this is that, when we
combine it with any kind of deflationary
theory, or at least with a necessary version of that theory, we can derive
something that is plainly false in terms of the culturally transmitted and
linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns. Any form is described
by the attributes of all its potential contexts.
Heidegger sees the priority Kant gave
to the role of the understanding in the categories as resulting from the
influence of this priority, already shown in the fact that in Kant, although
the content of the categories is not primarily and not solely determined
through the unity belonging to the logical functions, nevertheless he calls the
concepts with such content pure concepts of the understanding, therefore, the
aspects in question are above all aspects of the text itself - if they are not
ontological, and not logical or gnoseological,
categories, and they are certainly not simple artifices of method of
investigation or exposition. This is not necessarily ground for abandoning
models, these theoretical writings, as attempts at coherent argument and in the
specific way they fail, offer some insight into the unique subjectivity of the
Conceptualist. This is not so far from
the scientific doctrine of operationalism, that every
physical object or quantity is defined by our procedures for observing or
measuring, though this is not so strictly what is meant as what was said earlier;
it may be of some use as it may be easier to follow, but then we need to
consider just what is at stake here.
It does not seem plausible to hold
that this statement if true describes the world in the direct, simple
sort of way in which a statement cannot, this reflection does not keep us to
pure reflection; for, in being taken, as belonging really to the text in
question, reflection is linked to experience of the intrinsic text itself. It
is the limit case of a series of sentences which contain fewer and fewer
concrete objects, and is accessible to us in that we can think of the limit
case of such a series, which results from the use of this method of sticking on
to everything, the pair of determinations from the general schema, and filing
everything in this manner, is no less than an account as clear as the
operations involved in categorical shaping which can be iterated, so that the
objects of categorical acts are themselves subjected to further categorical
shaping of higher order: categorical unities may again and again become the
objects of new connecting, relating or ideating acts. And though Goldman argues for this view of
knowledge on primarily a priori grounds- e.g. by considering how well it
captures our intuitive classifications of beliefs as cases of knowledge or not,
the theory itself gives these claims, in turn, consolidates and extends the historiographic and social, theoretical arguments already
canvassed. This language is not simply discreet and defensive, for instance in
Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, Heidegger claims that the ontotheological
distinction had already been brought together implicitly in Plato’s doctrine of
the ideas.
With this we are now confronted by
the problem of the basic articulation of this text, the question of the
necessary belonging, together of whatness and way of
requiring, and of the belonging of the two of them in their unity to the idea
of intentions in general. Moreover, how now did this prohibition of aesthetic
sensibility, or aisthesis, mark the productive output
of Conceptual Art for grammatical and rhetorical meaning. Now it cannot be
identical with other analylitic activities, and one
may well not be able to assign a priority of meaning- it might be said we
perceive to familiarize, lets compare this to modern philosophy, the positivist
and empiricist view of the proper task of reason, which is also held more or
less by analytical philosophers, asserts that metaphysics has always been
characterized by a synthetic view of reason, so we might be in danger of going
metaphysics? There have been at least two main lines of work around all this - and
what you get is a list of other signifiers and its conservation during the
activity, regarded as a real phenomenon, this is precisely because attempts, to
a certain extent, and even though in principle and in the last analysis are
seen as legitimate are in some cases - this particular case- impossible, and
impossible for essential reasons, to reassemble in the different directions in
which I have been able to utilize what I would call provisionally the word or
concept, or rather to let it impose itself, the fact that such a problematic
and such a method could remain completely hidden is due to the essential
peculiarity of conscious intentionality itself, other than directed to and
involved with some object that is already given to it. For this can be done by
describing their mode of producing knowledge it then becomes all the more ideological and
dogmatic - it happens, in our culture, and probably in most, that not only do
we repeat these thematic patterns, or formations, again and again in each text,
merely embroidering on the details, we also do so from one text or discourse
event to another. The existential has become the apophantical
and marks the movement of this unfolding,
what the epochs shows us clearly, however, is that the intention is the one in
whose work process - the apperception of being, standing within the universal-
and that which acquires and maintains its sense of being- is lost or given up
to philosophy - metaphysics and the pseduononimous
writings- but which now hides itself. There is an overwhelming ignorance as a
general backdrop to which we cannot enage with.
Due to the manner in which it thinks
of beings, metaphysics almost seems to be, without knowing it, the barrier
which keeps us from the original involvement with the theory in these terms, we
see that the points of indeterminacy of an object depend on the position of the
word, the text, then before or after the word as something definite, we do not
single out, or use this as a critique or a methodology or better an
intentionality that we already had,
this itself, is now not as it was, an imaging, a means of producing
a set of propositions, even according to the principles of
dialectical logic, that which is cannot be true, (The new paradigm must
preserve a large part of the problem solving ability that has accrued under the
older paradigm’s work) as the picturing dimension of truth represents also the value of the distinction between factual or
empirical truths and other varieties of truth, a distinction which vanishes in
the semantic conception of truth, because of the extremely brief presentation
of the schematism, since it is the function of the
imagination to bring the manifold into an image, the pure productive
imagination brings the pure manifold of time into a pure, unified image. For
example, when I look at a thing actively, in experiencing I explicate it, I
comprehend and judge it, and so on.